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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis empirically investigates the e¤ectiveness of incentives systems in
rms and organizations. We are interested in how employees respond to dif-
ferent forms of monetary incentives. By the means of laboratory experiments
and eld data we analyze bonus systems based on subjective performance ap-
praisals, tournament incentives and pay-for-performance incentive schemes.
We study individual performance, cooperation, absenteeism and self-selection
as potential employee responses evoked by these incentives systems. The
interaction between individual preferences and compensation schemes is a
second focus of this thesis. In particular, we provide evidence on the link
between fairness concerns and evaluation behavior and the relevance of risk
preferences for self-selection. Based on the empirical ndings, we try to de-
rive practical implications for the optimal design of incentives in rms. The
following paragraphs briey motivate the research questions of each chapter,
summarize the main ndings and explain how they relate to each other.
Since work e¤ort is assumed to be costly to employees but benecial to
the rm, employment relationships comprise a natural conict of interest.
Resolving this conict by appropriate incentive schemes is a central theme
of personnel economics (see for instance Lazear and Shaw (2007)). If true
e¤ort was perfectly observable and thus contractible, incentives could easily
overcome the moral hazard problem and realign interests by compensating
employees for their e¤ort costs. Since in practice performance rather than
1
e¤ort is measurable, the design of optimal incentive plans is a delicate is-
sue. Even performance is rarely fully captured by objective measures, which
is why companies frequently rely on subjective performance evaluations to
decide upon bonus payments. This, however, gives supervisors discretion
over the distribution of ratings and thus the distribution of cash rewards in
the respective department. As a result, supervisors can bias performance
ratings according to individual preferences by, for instance, overstating true
performances and neglecting performance di¤erences among subordinates.
There are many reasons why supervisors may want to distort ratings.
Psychology-based explanations refer to the mental costs associated with com-
municating negative feedback or the risk of rising frustration and envy in
teams with higher pay dispersion. Alternatively, supervisors could try to
signal superior leadership competencies by exaggerating low performersrat-
ings. Moreover, when performance measures are fraught with measurement
error, supervisors may fear to make mistakes and prefer to pay everybody
the same than to pay someone less who actually deserves more. Likewise,
some supervisors simply want to avoid pay inequality among subordinates
or between themselves and their subordinates for fairness reasons. Inated
and compressed ratings may thus be the result of generosity or inequity aver-
sion. Indeed, several studies nd the distribution of subjective performance
evaluations to be heavily biased to the top and compressed to the middle of
the rating scale. Since performance changes are no longer reected in bonus
changes, incentives to improve subsequent performance should be watered
down (see Prendergast (1999) for a survey).
However, recent behavioral economic models may also predict the oppo-
site. Reciprocity models (e.g. Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) or Falk and Fischbacher (2006)) or the Fair-Wage-E¤ort Hypothesis
(Akerlof and Yellen (1988), Akerlof and Yellen (1990)) suggest that inated
bonus payments could be perceived as kind gifts which employees may want
to reciprocate by putting in extra e¤ort in subsequent years. Also bonus
di¤erentiation may be perceived as unfair and -according to recent outcome-
based models of inequity-aversion (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000)) - cause utility decreases for inequity averse employees.
2
In response to the potential negative e¤ects associated with biased rat-
ings, companies have implemented rating systems that prevent lenient and
compressed ratings. By assigning ranks or sorting xed percentages of work-
ers in pre-dened intervals of a performance distribution, supervisors are
sometimes forced to distinguish between good and poor performance. Such
systems, of which GEs "vitality curve" or the recently introduced forced
ranking system at AIG are famous examples, remain controversially dis-
cussed. While some cherish the benets of a competitive work environment,
others stress the lack of acceptance among the workforce. Recent law suits
initiated by employees who felt discriminated led some rms to abolish such
systems again.1
Chapter 2 of this thesis investigates the determinants and incentive e¤ects
of biased performance ratings in more detail. We use a real-e¤ort laboratory
study in which a supervisor repeatedly evaluates the performance of three
subordinates on a ve-point scale. Subordinates are paid according to their
individual rating while supervisors benet from higher group performance.
In the baseline treatment condition supervisors are unrestricted in their eval-
uation behavior and may inate or compress ratings as much as they like. In
another treatment supervisors must follow a pre-specied rating distribution,
forcing them to di¤erentiate between the top, middle and low performer in
their group. The main result of the study is that under enforced di¤eren-
tiation workers are roughly 5-12% more productive over the course of the
experiment. Importantly, the output increase does not come at the cost of
lower output quality.
The key results remains robust, also when the supervisor has to carry
some of the costs associated with employees bonuses. However, a forced
distribution seems to harm individual performance, when employees get the
chance to sabotage each other. We observe a signicantly higher amount of
sabotage activity under the forced distribution system.
While most supervisors in the baseline treatment inate and compress
ratings to maximize subordinatesbonuses, those that deliberately di¤eren-
1See for instance Performance Reviews: Many Need Improvement in the New York
Times (September 10, 2006).
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tiate signicantly improve group performance in the following periods. The
study also reveals that rating biases can be explained by supervisorsconcerns
for altruism or inequity aversion.
When bonus di¤erentiation is enforced, workers essentially compete for
the largest bonus payment in the group. Relative performance becomes
more important than absolute performance. The performance increase in
the forced distribution treatment may thus be attributed to the willingness
of subordinates to outperform their coworkers. To give subjects a realistic
chance to a¤ect their relative performance rank, we deliberately matched
individuals with others of similar abilities into groups.
In reality, however, individuals that compete for a wage increase, a promo-
tion or a contract may considerably di¤er with respect to ability, experience
or skill. When ability di¤erences are too large and evident, the inferior con-
testant may decide to save e¤ort costs as his chances to win are comparably
small. Anticipating such behavior, the superior contestant may decide to hold
back e¤ort as well. As a result, the overall e¤ort level and the intensity of the
tournament decreases. With regard to the study presented in chapter 1, one
could infer that the productivity gains associated with forced distribution
are smaller in heterogeneous work groups. While the e¤ect of heterogeneity
in tournaments is theoretically well understood (see for instance Lazear and
Rosen (1981)), only recently empirical studies provide rst evidence in line
with this prediction.
In Chapter 3 we add to the emerging empirical literature on this question
by analyzing professional sports data from the rst German handball divi-
sion. Statistics on sports contest often provide information on the ability or
performance of tournament participants, measures that are usually not in-
cluded in rm data sets but needed to test tournament theory. In our study
we explore game-specic sports betting odds to estimate team abilities and
collect data on the number of penalties committed by either team to measure
defensive e¤orts and the overall intensity of the tournament. While betting
odds allow us to construct a "market-e¢ cient" measure for ability di¤erences
between the competing teams, our measure of e¤ort needs more explanation:
We assume that a team who decides to put forth a lot of e¤ort has to play
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very physical defense. Often high defensive e¤orts will successfully prevent
goals by forcing the opponent to either turn the ball over, miss the goal or
commit a time-penalty. In some instances, defensive e¤orts will be outside
the legal norm and result in a penalty. In contrast to a game in which neither
team tries, penalties should thus be more common in high intensity games.
In line with standard tournament theory, our data show that contests
between heterogeneous teams are less intense as the number of committed
penalties is lower than in games between teams of similar ability. Our analy-
sis also reveals that while in theory both, the low and the top performer,
should optimally reduce e¤orts when paired for an asymmetric contest, only
the ex-ante dominant handball team plays less intensely. In our data, the
underdog shows no signicant reaction to the heterogeneity of the match up
and tries to win "against all odds". Further sub-analysis also reveals that ex-
ante ability di¤erences are not only a good predictor of tournament intensity
toward the beginning but also toward the end of the game. Irrespective the
observed halftime score, larger di¤erences in ex-ante winning probabilities
are associated with less intense play in the second half. Finally, we are able
to show that penalties may indeed serve as an e¤ort measure as teams who
commit more penalties (as a by-product of high e¤ort) are more likely to
win.
Since contests in sports and rms share essential characteristics, our study
points out that promotion tournaments may not be an e¤ective incentive
instrument when the competing individuals or teams considerably di¤er with
respect to ability or skill. In such instances rms may have to respond to ex-
ante di¤erences by handicapping the more able contestant at the beginning
of the tournament or refraining from using tournament incentives at all.
Chapters 2 and 3 thus analyze two incentive schemes frequently applied
when individual performance is either not objectively measurable or only
measurable in relative terms. Both studies also highlight potential ine¢ cien-
cies when individual incentives are used the wrong way. But companies may
not only be interested in eliciting optimal individual e¤orts, especially if this
comes at the expense of low cooperation. Nowadays a substantial amount
of work is organized in teams (e.g. Lazear and Shaw (2007)). Teams are
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usually installed when there are benets from combining individual e¤orts.
Due to, for instance, tasks interdependencies, the productivity of each in-
dividuals contribution may depend on the amount of team e¤ort invested
by other team members. For rms to benet from teamwork, it is therefore
essential that individuals are willing to cooperate. Incentivizing individual
performance goals but not team performance can cause employees to allo-
cate the bulk of their work time to individual rather than team assignments.
This type of distortion has been analyzed by Holmström and Milgrom (1991)
and is generally referred to as the multi-tasking problem. Even worse, when
individual incentives are based on relative performance, as for instance in
tournaments or under a forced distribution, employees may fully cease help-
ing or even decide to sabotage work activities of their colleagues (see Lazear
(1989) or Harbring and Irlenbusch (2011) and Chapter 1 for experimental
evidence). To prevent this crowding out of cooperation, rms frequently rely
on group incentives such as prot sharing schemes or rewards based on unit
or department success.
From an economic perspective, the e¤ect of group incentives on cooper-
ation is unclear. On the one hand, individuals should cooperate more than
in the absence of team incentives as they benet from higher team output.
On the other hand, team incentives generally bear the risk of free-riding
since individual contributions to a team output are usually not observable.
(Holmström (1982)). Especially when combined with individual incentives,
employees are given an incentive to free-ride on their group members team
e¤orts to save time and costs, better invested in meeting individual perfor-
mance targets. Of course, especially in smaller teams, free-riding is unlikely
to be tolerated by others and cooperation may be maintained via mutual
monitoring or "peer-pressure" (e.g. Kandel and Lazear (1992)).
In chapter 4 we empirically investigate the relation between compensation
schemes and cooperativeness in rms. We examine a representative sample
of 305 German rms from the year 2006 that provides detailed informa-
tion on the existence and strength of performance-related pay components,
i.e. the amount of worker pay that depends on individual, team or rm
performance. We map this information to roughly 36,000 employee survey
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responses, measuring the level of cooperation among workers in these rms.
Our main result is that 10 percentage points higher team incentives are as-
sociated with an 11% rise of employees who conrm that workers cooperate
in their rm. Individual performance incentives or rm-level incentives do
not relate to cooperation in the workforce. We also nd that cooperation
is in general higher in smaller teams and that the association between team
incentives and cooperation is stronger in smaller companies. Since employees
have fewer within-rm exit options and are more likely to interact with work
colleagues in the future, free riding on team incentives may be less likely to
occur. In addition, employees are also less frequently absent in rms with
higher team incentives.
The results are robust to subsample analyses and the inclusion of several
other control variables, capturing corporate culture and the overall level of
job satisfaction among workers. The results also do not seem to be driven by
cooperative workers self-selecting into rms that use team incentives. How-
ever, we do nd that workers with preferences for helping are more likely to
work in the health and social assistance industry and less likely to work in
nancial or business-related services.
In general, the question whether workers self-select into companies de-
pending on the compensation scheme in place is a relevant one. Theoretically,
performance-related pay should attract above average performing individuals
because they should earn more than under a xed wage contract. In con-
trast, below average performing employees should usually prefer contracts
with lower variable pay components. The seminal case study by Lazear
(2000) shows that selection indeed matters. Roughly half of the productivity
increase that followed the switch from xed to variable pay contracts could
be explained by more productive workers self-selecting into the company.
Besides a¤ecting the talent of employees, the introduction of performance-
related pay may also cause individuals with particular personality attributes
to self-select in or out of a company. Performance pay could, for instance,
attract competitive, overcondent, or risk seeking individuals. Risk averse
individuals, in contrast, should dislike wage uncertainty and prefer a xed
wage. While in principle the relation between risk attitudes and incentive
7
is straightforward, only recently Bellemare and Shearer (2010) and Grund
and Sliwka (2010) provided convincing eld evidence that risk preferences
can indeed explain the likelihood of working under incentive plans (see also
Dohmen and Falk (2011) for recent experimental evidence).
Knowing that incentive schemes a¤ect self-selection with regard to risk
attitudes, it is of course important to understand the determinants of risk
attitudes to foresee the consequences of introducing or changing incentive
plans. One of the most intensely studied determinants of risk aversion is
gender. In particular, there is a general consensus among recent experimen-
tal studies that women are more risk averse than men (see e.g. Eckel and
Grossman (2008b) and Charness and Gneezy (2010) for recent surveys). In
a recent literature overview Croson and Gneezy (2009), however, point out
that gender-specic di¤erences in risk preferences do not extend to profes-
sionals and managerial employees. According to Croson and Gneezy (2009),
one explanation could be that only employees who are willing to take risks
select themselves into managerial positions and that after this pre-selection
risk preferences are similarily distributed between women and men.
In the last chapter of this dissertation I investigate gender-specic di¤er-
ences in risk preferences among managerial and non-managerial employees in
more detail. In particular, I study two large surveys that are representative
for the German working population. At rst, I analyze the 2009 wave of the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The data set includes relatively
detailed information on job hierarchy, a validated measure of general risk
taking (Dohmen et al. (2011)) and two additional items measuring risk atti-
tudes in job-specic contexts. In addition to the GSOEP, I also make use of
the data set described in chapter 4. While this data set only provides a proxy
for individual risk preferences, it includes observations from male and female
employees from the same enterprise. This allows to control for unobserved
company specic xed-e¤ects which is not possible in the GSOEP data.
The main result of the study is that in both data sets substantial and
signicant gender-specic di¤erences in risk attitudes exist, not only among
non-managerial employees but also on the managerial level. Moreover, the
gender-specic di¤erences do not systematically vary across levels. Indepen-
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dent of gender, managers are more willing to take risks than employees on
lower levels. Thus while it could be true that more risk-loving employees
self-select into managerial positions, the e¤ect is not stronger for women as
conjectured by Croson and Gneezy (2009). The second data set also allows
me to investigate the connection between incentive pay and risk preferences.
In line with recent eld evidence by Bellemare and Shearer (2010) and Grund
and Sliwka (2010), I nd that employees who receive performance-related pay
are less risk averse than employees receiving a xed wage. The result seems
to be particularly robust for managers.
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Chapter 2
Performance Appraisals and
the Impact of Forced
Distribution - an Experimental
Investigation1
2.1 Introduction
In most jobs an employees true e¤orts are at best imprecisely captured by ob-
jective key gures. Hence, organizations frequently use subjective appraisals
to evaluate substantial parts of an employees job performance. While this
may strengthen the setting of incentives as more facets of job performance are
evaluated, the opposite may be true when supervisors bias the evaluations
according to personal preferences.2
There is indeed strong evidence from numerous studies indicating that
subjective performance ratings tend to be biased. First of all, it has often
been stressed that supervisors are too lenientand reluctant to use the lower
spectrum of possible performance ratings. Moreover, supervisors typically do
1This chapter is based upon Berger et al. (2010).
2For an overview see for instance Murphy and Cleveland (1995), Arvey and Murphy
(1998) or from an economics perspective Prendergast and Topel (1993), Prendergast and
Topel (1996) or Gibbs et al. (2003).
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not di¤erentiate enough between high and low performers such that ratings
tend to be compressed relative to the distribution of the true performance
outcomes.3 As rating scales nearly always have an upper boundary, rater
leniency often directly implies rating compression. While the existence of
these biases has been conrmed in previous studies, the mechanisms behind
these biases and the e¤ects on performance have only rarely been analyzed
empirically. Rynes et al. (2005), for instance, stress that although there is a
voluminous psychological literature on performance evaluation, surprisingly
little of this research examines the consequences of linking pay to evaluated
performance in work settings(p. 572).
A simple economic logic suggests that both of the above mentioned biases
should lead to weaker incentives. As high performance is not rewarded and
low performance is not sanctioned adequately, employees should have lower
incentives to exert e¤ort when they anticipate biased ratings. In contrast,
it may be argued that rating leniency can trigger positive reciprocity and
rating compression reduces inequity among coworkers which both may lead
to increased employee motivation.4
To avoid potential negative consequences of rater biases, some rms have
adopted so-called forced distributionsystems under which supervisors have
to follow a predetermined distribution of ratings. At General Electric, for
example, the former CEO Jack Welch promoted what he called a vitality
curve, according to which each supervisor had to identify the top 20% and
the bottom 10% of his team in each year. According to estimates, a quarter
of the Fortune 500 companies (e.g. Cisco, Intel, Hewlett Packard, Microsoft
etc.) link parts of individual benets to a relative performance evaluation
(Boyle (2001)). However, the use of these systems is often very controversially
3These two biases are often referred to in the literature as the leniencyand central-
ity bias. See for instance Landy and Farr (1980), Murphy (1992), Bretz et al. (1992),
Jawahar and Williams (1997), Prendergast (1999), or Moers (2005).
4Many experimental studies have now conrmed that higher wage payments indeed
trigger positive reciprocity and in turn can lead to higher e¤orts. See, for instance, Fehr
et al. (1993), Fehr et al. (1997), Hannan et al. (2002) or Charness (2004). Evidence
from eld experiments is somewhat less pronounced. Recent studies nd mostly moderate
support for positive reciprocity. See for instance Gneezy and List (2006), Cohn et al.
(2010), Kube et al. (2010), Bellemare and Shearer (2009) and Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2010).
11
discussed and in some rms even led to lawsuits as employees claimed to have
been treated unfairly.5
From an economic perspective, forced distribution systems have the struc-
ture of rank-order tournaments (see Lazear and Rosen (1981)), in which con-
testants compete for a limited number of prizes. In a forced distribution
system workers compete for one of the scarce good performance ratings that
are typically associated with a monetary reward, e.g. a bonus or a salary in-
crease. A well-known downside of tournaments, however, is the danger that
cooperation among workers within the organization is put at risk as there
is always an incentive to improve ones relative position by increasing ones
productive e¤ort but also by harming others, i.e. sabotaging others (Lazear
(1989)).
A key reason for the lack of eld evidence on the consequences of a forced
distribution is that, even when a rm changes its performance appraisals
system, there is typically no control group within the same rm with an
unaltered scheme. This in turn makes it hard to identify the causal e¤ect
of the modication. Moreover, to measure the performance consequences an
objective measure of individual performance is necessary. But such objective
measures are typically not available when subjective assessments are used.6
Hence, in this paper we investigate the performance consequences of a
forced distribution system in a real-e¤ort experiment. In each experimental
group, one participant in the role of a supervisor has to evaluate the per-
formance of three participants in the role of employees over several rounds.
Participants have to work on a real-e¤ort task where the outcome of their
work directly determines the supervisors payo¤. At the end of each round,
the supervisor learns the work outcome of each individual employee and is
then asked to individually rate their performance on a ve-point scale. The
employees receive a bonus payment based on this performance rating. We
5See for instance Performance Reviews: Many Need Improvement in the New York
Times (September 10, 2006).
6Typical examples of departments in which objective measures of performance are
available are sales functions in which revenues of individual sales agents can be measured.
But in these departments subjective assessments and in particular forced distributions are
hardly ever used because the objective performance measures already lead to di¤erentiated
ratings.
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examine two experimental settings: In the baseline treatment supervisors
are not restricted in their rating behavior. In a forced distribution treatment
they have to give di¤erentiated ratings. We also investigate additional treat-
ments in which a forced distribution system is either abolished or introduced
after some rating experience with or without such a system. Moreover, we
study a setting in which supervisors share the costs of the bonuses paid out to
the subordinates, as well as two additional treatments in which subordinates
can sabotage each other.
Our key result is that worker productivity in our experiment is about
5-12% higher under a forced distribution system when there is no possibility
to interfere with the colleagueswork. Moreover, we nd that in the absence
of a forced distribution system, supervisors who care more for the well-being
of others tend to assign more lenient and therefore less di¤erentiated ratings.
But weaker degrees of di¤erentiation lead to lower performance in subsequent
rounds. If, for instance, an employee receives the best potential rating, knows
about his relative performance and does not have the highest work outcome in
the group, his subsequent performance decreases. Interestingly, supervisors
seem to learn the advantages of di¤erentiation as they assign less lenient and
more di¤erentiated ratings after the forced distribution has been abolished
as compared to a setting in which it has never been used. In contrast,
the performance e¤ect of a forced distribution is strongly reduced when the
participants have experienced the more liberalbaseline setting before and,
hence, have di¤erent reference standards and expectations. The key results
are robust in a situation in which it is costly for the supervisors to assign
high bonuses.
While, to the best of our knowledge, there are no previous studies inves-
tigating the e¤ects of the introduction of a forced distribution on incentives,
some recent eld studies investigate the e¤ects of rating compression on fu-
ture outcomes. Engellandt and Riphahn (2011), Bol (2011), Kampkötter and
Sliwka (2011) and Ahn et al. (2010) give some indication that rating com-
pression is associated with lower subsequent performance. Direct empirical
evidence on the e¤ects of forced distributions is very scarce. Recently, Schle-
icher et al. (2009) have experimentally investigated raters reaction to forced
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distribution and nd that rating decisions are perceived as more di¢ cult
and less fair under a forced distribution system than in a traditional setting.
Scullen et al. (2005) conduct a simulation study and show that forced distrib-
ution can increase performance in the short run as low performers are driven
out of the rm. This e¤ect, however, becomes smaller over time. Neither
study examines the incentive e¤ects of forced distributions.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section the experimental design
and procedure are described. The experimental results are summarized in
section 2.3. We rst provide evidence on the performance di¤erence between
our baseline treatment and the forced distribution condition. Then, we take a
closer look at rating decisions within the baseline treatment and their relation
to workersperformance as well as the connection between the supervisors
social preferences and rating behavior. Moreover, we investigate the e¤ect
of past experience in a di¤erent rating setting on both, supervisor and the
worker behavior. Finally, we analyze two additional experiments, one in
which ratings are costly for the supervisors and one in which workers are
able to sabotage each other. We discuss and conclude our results in the last
section.
2.2 Experimental Design
We conduct a laboratory study investigating several di¤erent treatments. In
all treatments subjects in the role of a supervisorevaluate the performance
of other subjects in the role of workerswho have to work on a real-e¤ort
task. Supervisors benet from higher worker e¤orts in all treatments. For
each setting we compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors are not
restricted in their evaluation behavior to a forced distribution treatment.
Each treatment consists of several parts. In the following, we describe the
structure of our core setting.
Ability Test
In an initial pre-round all subjects have to work on a real-e¤ort task which
is also used in the main part of the experiment, i.e. all participants have to
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repeatedly count the number 7in blocks of randomly generated numbers
(see gure 2.7 for a screenshot of this task). This pre-round is independent
of the main experiment and conducted to collect a measure for each subjects
ability for the task and to familiarize participants with the task (also those
who are in the role of the supervisor). We have chosen the particular design
of the task for several reasons: First of all, the task is tedious and requires
real work e¤ort. Second, work outcomes are observable for supervisors and
the experimenter, i.e. we have a precise measure of performance that can be
compared between the otherwise identical treatments. Third, noise does not
play a substantial role for performance. And nally, it is possible to assess
the subjectsability and give the supervisors some experience with the task
before the experiment.
To make sure everybody has correctly understood the task, an exercise
block is presented on the computer screen prior to the pre-round. Only
after all subjects have correctly solved this block, the pre-round which lasts
for 2.5 minutes is started. During the pre-round each subjects performance
is measured by the number of pointscollected which is converted into Euro
after the experiment. For each correct answer a subject receives two points,
for each wrong answer it loses 0.5 points. At the end of the pre-round, a
piece-rate of 10 cents per point is paid to each participants account. During
the task subjects are also o¤ered the opportunity to use a timeoutbutton
which locks the screen for 20 seconds during which subjects cannot work on
any blocks. Each time the timeout button is pushed, the subject receives
8 cents. This timeout button is implemented to simulate potential further
opportunity costs of working. At the end of the pre-round, each participant
is informed about the total number of points achieved as well as the number
of correct and false answers and the resulting payo¤.7
Main Part: Performance Ratings and Bonus Payments
After the ability test, instructions for the rst part of the experiment are
distributed. Before this part of the experiment is started, participants have
7To avoid losses, the total number of points for a period were set to zero when the total
for this period was negative.
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to answer several test questions on the screen to make sure they have fully
understood the procedures and the payo¤ calculations.8 This rst part of
the experiment consists of eight periods, each lasting for 2.5 minutes. Each
participant is assigned to a group of four participants. One participant in
each group has the role of the supervisorand the other three participants
are workers. The group composition as well as the roles remain xed
throughout the experiment. The workers have to perform the same real-
e¤ort task as in the pre-round. They can again make use of a timeout button,
blocking the screen for 20 seconds for which they receive 25 cents on their
private account. After each round, each worker learns her total number of
points, the number of correct and false answers and the number of timeouts
chosen. Moreover, each worker is also informed about the number of points
and correct and false answers of the other two workers in her group. The
supervisor also receives this individual performance information for each of
the three workers in her group and then has to rate each worker on a rating
scale of 1to 5, with 1being the best and 5the worst rating available.
Rating Bonus Worker
1 10.00 e
2 7.50 e
3 5.00 e
4 2.50 e
5 0.00 e
Table 2.1: Ratings and bonus payments
Each rating is associated with a bonus payment for the worker (see table
2.1), ranging from 10 e for the highest rating 1to 0 e for the worst rating
of 5. It is important to stress that in our core setting the supervisor does
not personally bear the costs of the bonus payments. The reason is that in
most eld settings supervisors who evaluate the performance of employees
are not residual claimants but are themselves salaried employees and, hence,
higher bonus payments to subordinates do not lower their own income. We
8Participants have to calculate the payo¤s for a worker and a supervisor for an output
as well as a rating they themselves could freely choose.
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will later on vary this and investigate treatments in which supervisors bear
costs for higher bonus payments.
The round payo¤ for the worker is the sum of her bonus payment and the
payo¤from pushing the timeout button. The payo¤of the supervisor is solely
determined by the output of the three workers in her group. For each point
achieved by one of the three workers the supervisor receives 30 cents. At the
end of the round, each worker is informed about her rating, the number of
timeouts and her resulting payo¤. The worker does not learn about the other
workersratings in her group. One round is randomly determined in each
part of the experiment which is payo¤-relevant (for details see Procedures).
Matching of Groups
To create a situation in which performance ratings are not straightfor-
wardly due to ability di¤erences, we match participants into homogeneous
groups. The matching procedure is based on the performance in the pre-
round, i.e. all 32 subjects are individually ranked in each session based on
their total number of points achieved in the pre-round. The four participants
with the best ranking are assigned to a group, the four best individuals of
the remaining participants to the next group etc. Within each group, the
participant with the best performance is assigned the role of the supervisor.
Participants are not informed about the matching procedure to avoid strate-
gic considerations.9 Subjects only know they will be grouped with three
other participants. At the end of the experiment, a few additional decision
games are played to elicit subjectssocial preferences. After these games all
participants have to ll out a questionnaire.
Treatments
In our core setting we analyze two di¤erent treatments: In the baseline
treatment (Base) supervisors are not restricted in their rating behavior. In
the forced distribution setting (Fds), however, supervisors have to give one
9In one of our extensions we informed the subjects about the matching procedure and
added survey questions in the end of the experiment to investigate potential e¤ects of
the procedure. However, we did not nd evidence that this a¤ected the way in which
evaluations were conducted or the reactions to the evaluations.
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worker a rating of 1or 2, one worker a rating of 3and another worker a
4or 5. This restriction is explained to all participants in the treatment.
To also analyze the e¤ects of introducing or abolishing a forced distri-
bution system in a within-subject design, we split the experiment into two
parts, each consisting of 8 consecutive rounds. The group matching as well
as the assigned roles are kept constant across both parts. In our treatment
BaseFds, for example, participants work in the baseline setting for 8 rounds
(rst part) which are followed by 8 rounds of the forced distribution set-
ting (second part). To disentangle rating rule e¤ects from time and learning
e¤ects we conduct two additional treatments in which the rating rule does
not change across both parts of the experiment (BaseBase and FdsFds).
Therefore, we conduct four treatments in this setting (see table 2.2).
Treatment Round 1-8 Round 9-16
BaseBase Base Base
FdsFds Fds Fds
BaseFds Base Fds
FdsBase Fds Base
Table 2.2: Overview of treatments in the core setting
Procedures
After participants have arrived in the laboratory, they are seated in sep-
arated cabins where they receive the instructions for the pre-round of the
experiment. Participants are told that they are not allowed to communicate.
In case of any question, they have to raise their hand such that one of the
experimenters will come and help. The experiment starts after all partici-
pants have read the instructions and all questions have been answered. After
the pre-round, instructions for the rst part of the experiment are distrib-
uted. Instructions for the second part only follow after the rst part has been
completed.10
The instructions inform participants that only one of the eight rounds of
each part of the experiment will be payo¤-relevant for all participants. At
10In BaseBase and FdsFds the subjects are told after the rst part that the rules for
the second part of the experiment are the same as for the rst part.
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the end of each session, a randomly selected subject is asked to twice draw
one of 8 cards to determine which rounds will be paid out. The nal payo¤
for each subject consists of the money earned during the experiment and a
show-up fee of 4 e . The money is anonymously paid out in cash at the end
of each session.
In total, the core setting of the experiment consists of 8 sessions with
two sessions for each treatment condition. Thus, we have 64 subjects (16
independent groups) in each treatment with a total of 256 participants. It
is ensured that no one has been involved in an experiment with the same
real e¤ort task before. No subject participates in more than one session. On
average, a session lasts for 2.5 hours and the average payo¤ amounts to 27 e.
The experiment is conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Re-
search. All sessions are computerized using the experimental software z-Tree
(Fischbacher (2007)) and subjects are recruited with the online recruiting
system ORSEE (Greiner (2004)).
2.3 Results
In this section we rst give an overview of the performance e¤ect of the
forced distribution system in our core experimental setting. We then analyze
the driving forces behind the observed treatment di¤erences in more detail.
Section 2.3.4 provides an overview of spillover e¤ects observed when the
sequence of both settings varies in BaseFds and FdsBase. Finally, we report
the results of two additional experiment, one in which awarding bonuses is
costly for the supervisors and one in which workers can sabotage each other.
2.3.1 Performance E¤ects of Forced Distribution
We start with an analysis of the rst part. For each of the two treatment
conditions (Fds and Base) we have thus 32 strictly independent group ob-
servations.11
11Note that BaseBase and BaseFds on the one hand and FdsFds and FdsBase on the
other are perfectly identical in the rst part as participants only learn the rules of the
second part after the end of the rst one.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of ratings across treatments
Figure 2.1 contrasts the distribution of ratings in the rst eight periods
in Base and Fds. Evidently, supervisors in Base tend to assign very good
ratings, i.e. a 1 or 2, in the majority of cases (82%). Note that this
pattern closely resembles the typical leniency biasoften observed in orga-
nizational practice. Bretz et al. (1992), for instance, describe this as follows:
Performance appraisal systems typically have ve levels to di¤erentiate em-
ployee performance. However, even though most organizations report systems
with ve levels, generally only three levels are used. Both the desired and the
actual distributions tend to be top heavy, with the top Buckets relatively
full and the bottom buckets relatively empty. . . It is common for 60-70% of
an organizations workforce to be rated in the top two performance levels. . . .
Skewed performance distributions not only exist, but are common. As in
most real-world organizations, supervisors in the experiment do not have to
bear the direct costs of higher bonus payments.12 In this situation they in-
deed have a tendency to assign high bonuses to their subordinates, a behavior
limited by the forced distribution system. Nonetheless, within the degrees
12A setting in which higher ratings are costly for the supervisors is studied in section
2.3.5.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of group output across treatments
of freedom left by the system, the supervisors in Fds still follow the lenient
choices and strongly prefer the 1over the 2 and the 4over the 5 as
shown in the right panel of gure 2.1.
But it is of course important to investigate the performance consequences
of this rating behavior. A key hypothesis based on a simple economic rea-
soning is that the return to e¤ort should be lower in the baseline treatment
as compared to the forced distribution treatment. Hence, participants in
the role of employees should have lower incentives to exert high e¤ort lev-
els. Instead, one may argue that supervisors assign good grades on purpose,
hoping to trigger positive reciprocity on the workerspart and thereby in-
creasing their motivation. As already laid out in the introduction, numerous
gift-exchange experiments have provided evidence for the fair wage-e¤ort hy-
pothesis, positing that higher wage payments may lead to higher e¤orts.
Figure 2.2 plots the distribution of group output in both treatments. The
gure indicates that performance is indeed higher under the forced distribu-
tion. Group performance increases on average by about 5% and the di¤erence
raises to almost 9% when we analyze the second parts of the BaseBase and
FdsFds treatments.
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Figure 2.3: Group output over time across treatments
Taking a closer look at the evolution of work performance over time in
gure 2.3, we see that while performance is identical prior to the treatment
intervention (in the pre-round), average performance is substantially higher
across all periods of the experiment.13
We investigate the size and signicance of the performance e¤ect by run-
ning three di¤erent regression specications with either group output (the
sum of individual outputs per group) or individual output as the dependent
variable. Due to the matching procedure we control for the number of points
achieved by the group or the individual in the pre-round (period 0).14
As a rst, conservative econometric approach that preserves the indepen-
dence of observations, we compute the group average over all eight periods
and regress it on a treatment dummy and the pre-round performance using
13It is interesting to note that the qualitative shape of both graphs over time is quite
similar, reecting parallel e¤ects of learning and fatigue.
14Note that the matching of participants into homogeneous groups resulted in a very
low standard deviation of outputs within the majority of groups. In the pre-round, the
average standard deviation of worker output amounts to 0.71 output points. In only 6 out
of 64 groups the standard deviation exceeds 1.5 output units.
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only one data point per group.15 As the group observations are independent
and the treatment intervention exogenous, the estimated coe¢ cient of the
forced distribution dummy gives a clean estimate of the average treatment
e¤ect. In the second specication we use all group observations over time (i.e.
jointly achieved group points per period) and run random e¤ects regressions
which include periods dummies to control for the general time trend observed
in gure 2.3. In a thirdalternative we use observations from all individual
workers in all periods, again estimating a random e¤ects model. We report
standard errors clustered on the group level to account for the fact that ob-
servations from workers in the same group are not independent. The results
are reported in table 2.3. In the left panel we run all three specications
using absolute output measures. In the right panel we report specications
with the log of output as dependent variable.
15Similar results are obtained when only using the outputs from period 1.
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Column 1 shows that the forced distribution indeed signicantly increases
group performance by roughly three output units. This corresponds to a 5.6%
increase in group performance as displayed in model (4).16 The coe¢ cients
obtained in the random e¤ects models parallel these results. Furthermore,
in all specications pre-round performance is strongly correlated with actual
performance in the experiment. The estimate in column 1 suggests that
groups that solved one block more in the pre-round on average solved half a
block more in the experiment.
Investigating the treatment di¤erences with alternate productivity mea-
sures, such as the number of blocks nished per group and the number of
correct and false answers (see table 2.12 in the appendix), we nd that un-
der forced distribution subjects count and solve more blocks correctly while
making only slightly and insignicantly more mistakes.
To provide an even more conservative test without any distributional as-
sumptions, we additionally apply the following non-parametric procedure:
Due to our matching mechanism, groups within a treatment are, by deni-
tion, not drawn from the same population, but groups of the same rank with
respect to the pre-round performance are directly comparable across treat-
ments. We thus rank group observations in each treatment according to their
pre-round performance from 1 to 32 and calculate the output di¤erence of
each group with its counterfactual in the other treatment. E.g. the average
group output of the 8th able group in the Fds condition is compared with
the 8th able group in the Base condition. If there were no systematic output
di¤erences across treatments, we would expect to see balanced output di¤er-
ences between paired groups. However, in 21 out of 32 output comparisons
output is higher in the Fds groups. This di¤erence is statistically signicant
in a one-sided binominal test (p = 0:055).17
In principle, our experimental design allows two explanations for why
16Note that in log specication the coe¢ cient of 0:054 translates into an estimated
incease of 5.6% as e0:054 = 1:056.
17Applying the same test to test for di¤erences in pre-round performance we see that (i)
in 6 out of 32 comparison groups output was exactly the same and (ii) of the remaining
26 output is higher for 13 groups in Fds and 13 in Base. Hence, randomization performed
very well such that ability is equally distributed across the two treatment groups (see also
gure 2.3).
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productivity increases under Fds. The observed treatment di¤erence in per-
formance may be the result of subjects working harder, i.e. they solve more
blocks in a given amount of time, or taking less timeouts. Investigating the
choice of timeouts, we nd that the timeout option was rarely chosen in the
two core treatments. On average, only 0.7 timeouts per group were taken in
each round. Furthermore, there is no systematic di¤erence in timeout usage
across treatments.18 If we either control for the number of timeouts in the
regression or exclude group observations in which timeouts were taken, the
treatment e¤ect becomes stronger.
We also investigate whether the incentive e¤ect of forced distribution is
stronger among low or high talented groups. Table 2.13 extends our stan-
dard regression by an interaction term Fds x Pre-Round Group Output. The
substantially larger and highly signicant Fds coe¢ cient and the negative in-
teraction term reveals that forced distribution is particularly e¤ective among
low performing groups.19
Finally, we explore the performance e¤ect of Fds in the second eight
periods in the treatments BaseBase and FdsFds which allows us to check
the persistence of the observed e¤ects. Applying the identical identication
strategy as above, we nd rather similar results and the economic signicance
of the e¤ect gets even stronger: The regression results displayed in table
2.14 in the appendix show that the performance di¤erence between Fds and
Base amounts to 8.8% in the second part. The e¤ect is signicant across all
regressions and also when we apply the described non-parametric procedure
(p = 0:038, one-sided Binomial test).20
18In the rst eight periods, timeouts are slightly more frequent in the Fds condition
but the di¤erence is not statistically signicant. In the last 8 periods of the treatments
BaseBase and FdsFds, timeouts are less frequently used under forced distribution. In
periods 9-16 of Fds, in only 8 out of 128 group observations (period x group) at least one
timeout was observed compared to 48 out of 128 in the baseline treatment. However, this
di¤erence is also not signicant, neither in regressions, nor in non-parametric tests.
19However, the key results are qualitatively robust when we drop the four lowest groups
or when we drop the 10% highest and 10% lowest performing groups.
20When only considering the BaseBase and FdsFds treatment, there is a signicant
di¤erence in the pre-round outputs indicating that abilities are not equally distributed
across treatments in this smaller sample. But as mentioned, abilities are evenly distributed
when we consider the larger number of independent observations.
26
2.3.2 Di¤erentiation and Productivity
But why do people work harder under the forced distribution? A key con-
jecture is that under the forced distribution incentives to exert e¤ort are
strengthened as supervisors di¤erentiate more according to individual per-
formance. We therefore analyze whether performance is rewarded di¤erently
in the two treatments. In principle, supervisors can condition their grading
behavior on two dimensions: they can reward absolute and relative perfor-
mance. We naturally should expect that the relative rank plays a key role
under the forced distribution. But even in the baseline treatment supervisors
may condition their grading behavior on the employees relative rank in the
group. However, they may do so to a smaller extent as they are not forced
to di¤erentiate. In contrast, variations in absolute performance may a¤ect
grading in both treatments. To investigate this, we run random e¤ects re-
gressions with the bonus received in a period as dependent and the absolute
output and relative rank of a worker as independent variables.21 To illustrate
treatment di¤erences, we include interaction terms with a dummy variable
for the forced distribution treatment.
The results are reported in table 2.4. Note that the relative rank matters
in both treatments but does so to a much larger extent under forced distrib-
ution as indicated by the substantially larger rank coe¢ cients in column (2)
and the signicant interactions of rank and Fds in columns (3-4). Interest-
ingly, while within-rank variation in output is rewarded in both treatments,
these rewards are stronger in the baseline treatment. For a given rank, out-
put and bonus are more strongly (positively) correlated than under forced
distribution. This is indicated by the substantially smaller output coe¢ cient
in column (2) and the signicant negative interaction of output and Fds
in columns (3-4). But, apparently, competing for ranks generates stronger
incentives in the forced distribution treatment as shown by the positive inter-
action terms of ranks and Fds. The competition for ranks indeed induces a
tournamentamong the agents. As the literature on tournaments - starting
with Lazear and Rosen (1981) - has pointed out, tournament competition
21The last rank 3 is the reference group.
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can indeed be a powerful incentive instrument.22 However, it is interesting
to note that supervisors in the baseline setting could have also implemented
such a tournament but apparently did not condition on relative rank su¢ -
ciently to induce similar high powered incentives.
It is furthermore interesting to note that for a given output agents obtain a
higher bonus the lower their performance in the pre-round. This is indicated
by the negative coe¢ cients for pre-round group output. Since our match-
ing procedure produces homogenous groups, agents with higher pre-round
performance are grouped together. Hence, a higher pre-round performance
increases the reference level relative to which supervisors compare individual
output. It may therefore be harder to obtain a high bonus in a stronger
group.23
Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of grades for the top, middle, and low
performers in the rst eight periods across both treatment conditions.24 In
the forced distribution treatment 91% of the participants with the highest
rank receive a "1" or a "2" and 88% with the lowest rank a "4" or a "5". In
contrast, about 60% of the worst performers still receive a "1" or a "2" in
the baseline treatment. Hence, the gains from improving the rank are much
weaker in the baseline treatment.
We can also investigate a workers direct reaction to a particular grade.
Table 2.5 reports results from a random e¤ects regression with individual
output in t+1 as the dependent and dummy variables for the grade assigned
in period t as independent variables. The reference category corresponds to
receiving the top grade 1. Model (1) analyzes the average reaction of all
workers in the baseline setting. Model (2) only includes the observations of
the top performers and model (3) only the observations of the middle and low
22For experimental evidence on tournaments see for example Schotter and Weigelt
(1992), Orrison et al. (2004) or Harbring and Irlenbusch (2011).
23When we add dummies for the group rank, the e¤ect of lower pre-round performance
disappears and is instead captured by the signicant group dummies. But all other re-
gression coe¢ cients and signicance levels remain very similar. Note that group rank,
worker and supervisor ability are highly correlated which makes it hard to disentagle the
inuences of each variable. Further analyses, however, suggests that rating behavior (e.g.
the rating di¤erentiation) does not depend on the ability of the supervisor.
24We dene top, middle and low performers according to the relative performance rank
in the group in a given round.
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Dependent Variable: Individual Bonus
Base Fds Base vs. Fds BaseBase
vs. FdsFds
Periods
1-8
Periods
1-8
Periods
1-8
Periods
9-16
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Output 0.284*** 0.0922*** 0.258*** 0.221***
(0.0337) (0.0147) (0.0291) (0.0415)
Output  Fds -0.155*** -0.121***
(0.0294) (0.0407)
Rank 2 0.705*** 2.064*** 0.780*** 0.761***
(0.196) (0.152) (0.179) (0.234)
Rank 1 0.926*** 5.747*** 1.047*** 1.078***
(0.344) (0.373) (0.326) (0.303)
Rank 2  Fds 1.159*** 1.605***
(0.245) (0.251)
Rank 1  Fds 4.424*** 5.206***
(0.518) (0.368)
Fds -1.372** -2.486**
(0.567) (1.063)
Pre-Round Group Output -0.132*** -0.0434*** -0.0824*** -0.0539**
(0.0382) (0.0129) (0.0195) (0.0242)
Constant 4.186*** 1.870*** 3.780*** 3.438***
(0.721) (0.272) (0.567) (0.952)
Observations 768 768 1,536 768
Number of Subjects 96 96 192 96
Wald Chi2 468.10 1762.93 1855.37 3382.97
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on group_id)
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Random e¤ects regression (period dummies included), reference category: rank 3
Table 2.4: The impact of rank and output on bonus payments
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of ratings according to relative performance in the
group
performers in each period. Since grade 5 is rarely observed we pool grades 4
and 5.
We indeed observe signicant immediate reactions in those cases where
the grade obtained is particularly informative about a supervisors grading
policy: Middle and low performers substantially increase their outputs after
receiving a 2 or a 3 compared to receiving the top grade 1. Thus,
those who are not the best performers and yet receive the top grade reduce
their e¤orts which supports the view that lenient and undi¤erentiated ratings
indeed undermine performance incentives.25 When the forced distribution is
in place, subjects know the rating policy as grades are mostly determined
by output ranks. In turn, receiving a particular grade does not provide
valuable additional information and, indeed, we nd weaker reactions to
grades. However, as can be seen in column (5), top performers on average
reduce their e¤orts after receiving a 4 or a 5. In this case they can
25This is in line with the experimental study by Abeler et al. (2010) who nd that
e¤orts are substantially lower in a multiagent gift exchange experiment when principals
are forced to pay all agents the same wage.
30
directly infer that worse performing coworkers have obtained better grades
and that high performance is not rewarded.
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We also study timeouts as a potential reaction to ratings. Arguable,
taking a timeout is an even simpler and less ambiguous measure of discontent
or a lack of motivation. Table 2.15 therefore explains the sum of timeouts
taken by an individual in period t + 1 by the rating received in period t.
Indeed, we nd that agents reacted with their timeout choices to the grading
behavior. The pattern in which they do parallels the relation of grades and
output presented in table 2.5 (but of course the other way around). While
we observe that in general receiving a 3 instead of a 1 decreases the
likelihood of observing a timeout for that given worker in the next period,
the e¤ects of grades again depend on the relative performance rank of the
individual. While top performers (column 1) are signicantly more likely to
take a timeout in response to a 2instead of a 1, we nd that giving worse
grades to the middle and low performers has positive productivity e¤ects (less
timeouts).
These results suggest that supervisors will induce higher performance in
subsequent rounds by di¤erentiating in their ratings. To test this, we run
random e¤ects regressions in BaseBase, using the group output in period
t+1 as the dependent variable and dummy variables for each span of grades,
i.e. the di¤erence between the worst and the best rating assigned by the
supervisor, in round t as key independent variables. The results are reported
in table 2.6. No di¤erentiation, i.e. cases in which each worker receives
the same rating, serves as our reference category.26 The results suggest that
extending the range of applied ratings from 0 to 1 in the rst eight periods
increases subsequent productivity on average by 4 1/2 points (6%) in the
rst part. Extending the range of grades from 0 to 2 also has a signicant
positive e¤ect on subsequent performance. This e¤ect seems to be larger in
the second part of the experiment.27
26In 24% of all rounds in Base the supervisor assigned all workers the best rating "1"
and in 25% of all rounds she/he assigned the same rating to all three participants. In the
second part of BaseBase the percentages rise to 29% and 31% respectively.
27Note that an observed span of grades larger than 2 occured in only 31 out of 256
rating decisions in the rst part of Base. Similar to the previous regression the results
for large spans are mixed. While it seems to improve performance in the last 8 periods,
it has no signicant e¤ect on subsequent output in the rst part of the experiment. One
potential explanation could be that some workers did not work at all after receiving such a
33
Dependent Variable: Group Outputt+1
Base (periods 1-8) BaseBase (periods 9-16)
(1) (2)
Span of Grades=1t 4.416*** 2.737
(1.045) (1.709)
Span of Grades=2t 2.681** 6.367***
(1.045) (1.413)
Span of Grades=3 or 4t 2.338 6.097**
(2.685) (2.749)
Group Outputt 0.604*** 0.331***
(0.0962) (0.0870)
SD of Outputt 0.0637 -0.0665
(0.188) (0.231)
Pre-Round Group Output 0.257*** 0.511***
(0.0786) (0.118)
Constant 10.45*** 20.21***
(2.782) (3.330)
Observations 224 112
Number of Groups 32 16
Wald Chi2 1073.37 4289.67
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Random e¤ects regression (period dummies included)
Reference category: span of grades=0t
Table 2.6: The impact of deliberate di¤erentiation on subsequent output
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Additional evidence for positive e¤ects of deliberate di¤erentiation can
be derived from our post-experimental questionnaire. As already mentioned
above, we asked subjects in the role of the supervisors about their rating
behavior in both parts of the experiment. The items28 I assigned bad ratings
to motivate the workersand I assigned bad ratings to sanction the workers
are both positively correlated with a higher group output in the second part
of the experiment (signicant at the 10% and 5%-level). Moreover, these
self reported measures of di¤erentiation are highly correlated with actual
di¤erentiation in the second part of the experiment (e.g. span of grades),
even after controlling for group output.29
2.3.3 What drives Rating Behavior?
As the personnel psychology literature30 has already stressed, the personality
of the rater a¤ects evaluation behavior. In the language of (behavioral)
economics we should straightforwardly expect that the supervisors social
preferences such as inequity aversion, altruism, or surplus concerns a¤ect
the way in which performance ratings are assigned. To investigate this we
elicit subjects social preferences before nal payo¤s are communicated in
our experiment.
In particular, there are two direct potential explanations for lenient rat-
ings. On the one hand, throughout all treatments supervisors earn more
than workers. In turn, supervisors who are inequity averse (compare Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)) may want to reduce this
inequity by assigning better grades. On the other hand, as has been stressed
for instance, by Charness and Rabin (2002) many individuals are also mo-
tivated by e¢ ciency concerns (i.e. they may strive for maximizing the total
surplus of all participants to some extent) or are altruistic and therefore di-
rectly care for the payo¤s of others and thus should assign better grades that
low grade. Due to the increase in noise, the positive coe¢ cient is not signicant anymore.
28For all items we used a 7-point scale running from 1 "does not apply at all" to 7 "fully
applies".
29Regression results available upon request.
30See for instance Kane et al. (1995) or Bernardin et al. (2000).
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lead to higher bonuses.
To investigate these drivers we apply an adapted version of an incentivized
experimental procedure introduced by Blanco et al. (2010) and modied by
Dannenberg et al. (2007). It consists of simple choice experiments in which
participants have to choose between pairs of payo¤ tuples, specifying a pay-
ment to themselves and to some randomly drawn other subject. In the rst
set of choices (Game A, see table 2.16 in the appendix) participants have to
choose between a rather low but equitable payo¤ tuple (1; 1) and inequitable
tuples with higher overall payo¤s but entailing a higher payment to the other
subject. In the second set of choices (Game B) subjects have to choose
between a combination of a high payo¤ for themselves and no payo¤ for the
other subject (5; 0) and equitable tuples which give both participants the
same payo¤ but potentially a lower payo¤ to the decision maker himself.
From the choices in these two games, we classify supervisors into four dif-
ferent types. Subjects who only maximize their own payo¤ are classied as
selsh. Subjects who (i) reduce their own payo¤ to increase the others and
the overall surplus but (ii) do not reduce joint surplus to avoid disadvan-
tageous inequity, are classied as altruistic. Subjects who do the opposite,
i.e. they do not reduce their own payo¤ to increase the overall surplus but
reduce the joint surplus to avoid disadvantageous inequity are envious. And
nally, those who reduce their own payo¤ to increase the overall surplus but
also reduce joint surplus to avoid disadvantageous inequity are characterized
as equity oriented.31
We now expect that both the altruistic and the equity oriented types
assign better grades. But while the altruistic types should do that uncondi-
tionally, we should expect that equity oriented types make a stronger connec-
tion between performance and the assigned ratings. We do not expect that
31The relevant switching points are #3 for game A and #21 for game B. As stressed by
Blanco et al. (2010) and Dannenberg et al. (2007) these games can be used to infer  and
 in a Fehr and Schmidt (1999) type utility function. It is interesting to note that this
procedure typially gives negative estimates of  for a non negligible fraction of subjects,
i.e. those who are willing to sacrice own payo¤ to increase overall surplus even though
they are worse o¤ than their counterpart. We classify these subjects as altruists.
As laid out by Blanco et al. (2010) (footnote 20 on p. 30) the Fehr Schmidt utility
function also captures surplus concerns when allowing for negative values of .
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envious typesrating behavior di¤ers from selsh ones as the supervisors are
typically better o¤ than workers.
Dependent Variable: Group Bonus Span of Grades
Base Fds Base Fds
(Periods 1-16) (Periods 1-16)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 if Envious 1.882 -0.149 -0.344 0.0726
(2.081) (0.533) (0.383) (0.186)
1 if Altruistic 3.430** 0.369 -0.760*** 0.0336
(1.594) (0.299) (0.232) (0.102)
1 if Equity 2.553 0.0215 -0.545* -0.0226
(1.782) (0.358) (0.289) (0.123)
Group Output 0.230*** 0.0427*** -0.0400*** -0.000122
(0.0355) (0.00927) (0.00648) (0.00270)
SD of Output -0.300*** -0.0392** 0.171*** 0.0669***
(0.0779) (0.0189) (0.0173) (0.00881)
Pre-Round Group Output -0.108*** -0.0221*** 0.0156*** -0.00261
(0.0370) (0.00777) (0.00547) (0.00239)
BaseFds -0.875 0.101 0.0504 -0.0450
(1.228) (0.239) (0.231) (0.0749)
FdsBase -2.168* -0.199 0.461** 0.0554
(1.225) (0.304) (0.228) (0.0913)
Constant 14.63*** 15.35*** 2.727*** 2.646***
(2.429) (0.630) (0.382) (0.203)
Observations 504 472 504 472
Number of Groups 47 45 47 45
Wald Chi2 261.53 224.25 393.70 297.09
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Random e¤ects regression (period dummies included)
Reference category: 1=Selsh supervisors
Table 2.7: What drives rating behavior?
Table 2.7 now reports regression results with the total of bonus pay-
ments awarded to the group or the span of grades as dependent variables and
dummy variables for the di¤erent types as independent variables (reference
group are the selsh supervisors). As expected, we observe the supervisors
type indeed matters in the baseline setting. Altruistic types award the high-
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est grades. Compared to the supervisors classied as selsh, they give an
additional 4 e of bonus to their group in each round. The coe¢ cient for the
equity oriented types is positive but just fails to be signicant. However, col-
umn 3 shows that equity oriented types choose signicantly more compressed
ratings. Since supervisors earn substantially more than workers, envious su-
pervisors do not rate di¤erently than selsh types.32 We also investigate to
what extent the di¤erent supervisor types base their rating decisions on the
relative rank and absolute output of the agents. Running the same regres-
sions of table 2.4 separately for each supervisor type reveals that rank has
the highest e¤ect on the bonus paid out by selsh and envious supervisors,
but a much weaker e¤ect for altruistic and equity-oriented ones.33
2.3.4 Introducing or Abolishing a Forced Distribution?
In this section we take a closer look at within-treatment variations of forced
distribution. In a rst step, we investigate the e¤ects of introducing a forced
distribution in the second part of the experiment after the agents have ex-
perienced the baseline condition in the rst part. Because we have to take
learning e¤ects into account, we compare the performance in the second part
of BaseFds with the performance in the second part of BaseBase.
Given the results of the between treatment comparison described above,
we should expect forced distribution to increase performance in the second
part of BaseFds. However, a direct comparison reveals that on average across
all periods of the second part the introduction of a forced distribution does
not lead to a higher performance as shown by column (1) of table 2.8. How-
ever, a surprising pattern emerges when we compare the e¤ects per period
as shown in column (2). While performance rst increases by about 5 points
in period 9 and stays at this level in period 10, it drops to roughly 2-3 points
below the baseline level in the last 6 periods. Hence, participants are ap-
32Social preferences do not explain rating behavior under forced distribution. Most
likely, the rating scheme does not allow enough variation for ratings to be a¤ected by
individual preferences.
33Regression results available upon request.
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parently initially motivated to work harder under the forced distribution as
they immediately seem to understand that they have to put in higher e¤orts.
However, they quickly learn that it is much harder to attain good grades. In
contrast to a setting in which a forced distribution is present from the outset,
participants now have a di¤erent reference standard as they have experienced
more favorable ratings in the past. This may lead to a decrease in motivation
under Fds. This is in line with recent eld studies by Ockenfels et al. (2010)
and Clark et al. (2010), showing that the violation of reference points for
bonus payments can have detrimental e¤ects on subsequent performance.
A di¤erent explanation would be that forced distribution leads to a dif-
ferent pattern of exhaustion in the second part of the experiment. To test
this, we compare the last 8 periods of BaseFds to the treatment in which the
forced distribution has been used throughout the experiment (FdsFds). But
as column (1) of table 2.9 shows, the forced distribution system in the second
part performs worse after the baseline setting as compared to the situation
in which agents work under a forced distribution right from the beginning.
Hence, it is indeed the experience of the baseline setting with higher grades
and bonuses which leads to a demotivational e¤ect of the forced distribution.
The negative perception of this relative payment loss apparently seems to
counteract the positive forces of increased di¤erentiation. The highly sig-
nicantly di¤erence in timeouts, displayed in column (2), also supports this
explanation.
We can also compare the performance of the baseline condition after
the experience of a forced distribution to the treatment in which the baseline
condition is kept over both parts of the experiment. The positive coe¢ cient of
FdsBase in column (2) indicates that groups in which Fds has been abolished
are roughly 7% more productive than workers in BaseBase. Analogously to
the above reasoning, workers in FdsBase seem to be particularly motivated
in the second part as they receive (on average) much better grades than
under the previous rating scheme. Relative to the workers who have already
received inated ratings over the rst 8 rounds (BaseBase), the workers in
FdsBase could feel more inclined to reciprocate this relative increase in bonus
payments. Yet, another factor driving this result is that supervisors keep up
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Dependent Variable: Group Output
BaseFds vs. BaseBase (periods 9-16)
(1) (2)
BaseFds -0.855 5.372*
(2.566) (3.147)
BaseFds  Period 10 -1.594
(3.432)
BaseFds  Period 11 -7.844*
(4.560)
BaseFds  Period 12 -8.125***
(2.930)
BaseFds  Period 13 -8.844**
(3.541)
BaseFds  Period 14 -7.438**
(3.490)
BaseFds  Period 15 -7.781*
(4.253)
BaseFds  Period 16 -8.188***
(3.108)
Pre-Round Group Output 0.675*** 0.675***
(0.082) (0.083)
Constant 40.55*** 37.44***
(4.576) (4.461)
Observations 256 256
Number of Subjects 32 32
Wald Chi2 148.70 325.12
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Random e¤ects regression (period dummies included)
Table 2.8: E¤ects of the introduction of a forced distribution
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di¤erentiation even after forced distribution has been abolished. Indeed, we
nd some evidence that supervisors in FdsBase tend to di¤erentiate more
during the second part than their counterparts in BaseBase (for a given
output). Workers ranked 2nd or 3rd in a group are signicantly less likely
to receive a "1" for a given output and more likely to receive a "4" or "5"
in the second part of FdsBase than in BaseBase. Also, as indicated by the
negative FdsBase dummy in column 1 of table 2.7, ratings are on average
lower than under BaseBase. Hence, the experience with a forced distribution
apparently has helped to establish a norm of making performance-contingent
ratings which indeed leads to a better performance.
Dependent Variable: Group Output Group Timeouts
BaseFds BaseBase BaseFds BaseBase
vs. FdsFds vs. FdsBase vs. FdsFds vs. FdsBase
Periods 9-16 Periods 9-16
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BaseFds -5.763* 0.735***
(2.994) (0.268)
FdsBase 4.591* -0.0055
(2.363) (0.015)
Pre-Round Group Output 0.514*** 0.644*** 0.00212 0.291
(0.087) (0.105) (0.00725) (0.375)
Constant 56.09*** 41.04*** -0.286 0.959
(5.187) (5.312) (0.377) (0.724)
Observations 256 256 256 256
Number of Groups 32 32 32 32
Wald Chi2 318.06 57.95 19.93 11.07
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Random e¤ects regression (period dummies included)
Table 2.9: Introducing and abolishing forced distribution
Additional evidence for these arguments comes from our post-experimental
questionnaire. We pose participants who experience both settings in BaseFds
and FdsBase a variety of questions separately for both parts of the experi-
ment. Especially workers in BaseFds feel that their e¤ort paid o¤to a greater
41
extent during the baseline setting. They also state that the supervisors be-
havior is more fair and that she is more capable of giving appropriate ratings
in the absence of a forced distribution. The supervisors also express some
dissatisfaction towards the forced distribution as, for instance, they perceive
rating decisions to be more di¢ cult in the second part of BaseFds which is
well in line with the ndings by Schleicher et al. (2009).
2.3.5 Forced Distribution and Costly Grades
In most rms the performance of employees is rated by supervisors who them-
selves are salaried employees. Hence, these supervisors typically do not bear
the costs of higher bonus payments. However, they may still have some costs
of handing out high bonuses freely. For instance, their own bonus payments
may be tied to the compliance with a given bonus budget. Similarly, when
a prot sharing scheme is in place, the supervisors own income is reduced
when bonus payments to subordinates are too high.
To check the robustness of our results, we therefore investigate a further
treatment in which assigning high ratings is costly for the supervisors. In this
treatment the supervisors income is reduced by 50% of the bonus awarded
to her agents. Table 2.10 summarizes these costs. To ensure that supervisors
always have the possibility to assign the top grade to all of their workers,
they are endowed with an additional 15 e per period.34
Rating Bonus Worker Supervisor Costs
1 10.00 e 5.00 e
2 7.50 e 3.75 e
3 5.00 e 2.50 e
4 2.50 e 1.25 e
5 0.00 e 0.00 e
Table 2.10: Ratings, bonus payments and costs
34We added one additional change in this new treatment: Based on the comments of
an anoynmous referee, we explicitly told subjects how the supervisor was selected after
the pre-round. We additionally extended the post-experimental questionnaire to check for
potential e¤ects of this procedure but did not nd evidence that this a¤ected participants
behavior.
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Figure 2.5: Group output over time across treatments when ratings are costly
Figure 2.5 shows the average output over time in the rst part of the new
treatments.35 The results are qualitatively surprisingly similar to our earlier
results and the e¤ect of a forced distribution seems to have an even stronger
impact on performance.
Average group output is 59.6 in BaseCost and 67.2 in FdsCost and even
though groups in BaseCost are on average slightly more productive in the
pre-round, performance is already higher in early periods of FdsCost and
increases over time. As the regression results in column 3 of table 2.17
show, the performance di¤erence amounts to 9.4 output units or 12% and
is signicant at the 5% level. Again this di¤erence is also conrmed by the
non-parametric testing procedure laid out in the above (p = 0:059, one-sided
binominal test). This is the case even though in the pre-round groups in the
FdsCost treatment are (weakly) signicantly less productive than groups in
the BaseCost treatment.
We also studied agents behavior in a second part where participants
worked for another 8 periods under the same rules. Interestingly, the treat-
35One group in BaseCost had to be dropped due to a technical problem with the exper-
imental software.
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ment di¤erence is no longer signicant in all periods. While the treatment
coe¢ cient is still substantial (6.99), the standard error is now much higher,
indicating that output is noisier in the second part. One part of the reason is
a sharp performance increase in period 9 of BaseCost. Here, the average per-
formance in the baseline treatment even exceeds the performance under the
forced distribution. A potential explanation is the following: In the baseline
treatment there is a considerable endgame e¤ect in period 8 as apparently
workers anticipated low bonus payments in the last period and decided to
put in less e¤ort (see gure 2.7). After the unexpected restart, workers (i)
were more rested and (ii) had an incentive to signal their willingness to work
as the game continued for another 8 periods. Indeed, the number of group
timeouts taken dropped from more than 5 in period 8 to less than 1 in pe-
riod 9. This e¤ect is absent under forced distribution. Finally, when only
considering the last two periods of the second part, the treatment di¤erence
is signicant again. Under the forced distribution workers know that even in
the last period one of the agents must receive a high bonus. This avoids the
endgame e¤ect present in the baseline treatment when bonuses are costly.
2.3.6 Forced Distribution and Sabotage
The previous chapters demonstrated that forcing supervisors to di¤erenti-
ate their evaluations may positively a¤ect performance when workers work
on their own. In many jobs, however, workers frequently interact with col-
leagues and may therefore mutually inuence work outcomes. In a positive
sense, workers may help and support others to do their work. By the same
token, workers may also behave uncooperatively, deny help or even sabotage
coworkers. Examples for such behavior could be withholding viable informa-
tion or, in the extreme, deleting les on computers, stealing othersequipment
or the like. It is crucial to understand that the e¤ectiveness of incentives de-
pends on the environment they are embedded in. Indeed, the literature on
tournaments has stressed that tournament competition can create incentives,
not only for productive work but also to sabotage each other (Lazear (1989)
see Harbring and Irlenbusch (2011) for experimental studies on this issue).
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With regard to systems of forced distribution Prendergast claims:Forced
rankings also increase competition for merit pay, which is counterproductive
in environments where cooperation is important to production (Prendergast
and Topel (1993), p. 362).
We test this conjecture with a simple treatment variation of our current
experimental setup. In addition to counting numbers and taking timeouts,
subjects are explicitly given the opportunity to block a coworkers screen for
20 seconds such that the fellow worker can not work or take timeouts. This
sabotage optionis costly as the choice of blocking somebody elses screen
blocks the own screen for three seconds, modeling the fact that sabotage also
incurs some costs for the workers. There is no restriction on the frequency of
sabotage, i.e. subjects can block other subjects as often as they like.36 After
being blocked for 20 seconds, it is ensured that subjects can not be sabotaged
again within the next 5 seconds of that period. Sabotage is anonymous, i.e.
the sabotaged worker does not know by whom she is sabotaged. Again, we
study this setting over two parts of 8 periods each, keeping the two treatment
conditions baseline (BaseSabo) and forced distribution (FdsSabo) unchanged
in both parts.
The key hypothesis is that forced distribution should lead to higher sabo-
tage activities as workers compete for the high ratings and can improve their
position by harming coworkers. Together with our prior results we there-
fore conjecture that a trade-o¤ exists as the forced distribution may increase
incentives but may also induce wasteful sabotage activities.
Indeed, we nd that subjects use the sabotage option twice as often under
the forced distribution (about 8 times per group and period) than under
baseline. Moreover, this di¤erence leads to strongly detrimental consequences
for overall group performance. As a result, average group performance under
the forced distribution is as low as 33.3 which is 18 points below the baseline
treatment with sabotage. The di¤erences in sabotage choices as well as
performance are highly signicant in regressions as displayed in column 5
& 6 in table 2.17. Figure 2.6 depicts the performance over time across the
36However, they are told that there is no e¤ect if the subjects screen they intended to
sabotage is already blocked or if the subject is in a timeout.
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Figure 2.6: Group output over time across treatments when sabotage is
possible
two settings and suggests that the performance di¤erence even increases over
time.
The treatment di¤erence is also robust when we again apply the non-
parametric test to compare the di¤erences across groups of the same rank
with respect to pre-round performance from both treatments (p < 0:01, one-
sided binominal test).
It is furthermore interesting to note that higher degrees of di¤erentiation
also lead to more sabotage activity within baseline treatment alone and thus
lower performance in subsequent periods (see table 2.18). Hence, more dif-
ferentiation indeed sets incentives to outperform coworkers and the easiest
way to do this is to use the sabotage option. The results for the second
part of the experiment are very similar. The di¤erences in performance and
sabotage become even larger compared to the rst part as can be seen in
column 5 & 6 of table 2.17.
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2.4 Conclusion
We study the impact of a forced distribution in a real-e¤ort experiment
in which performance is endogenously evaluated by participants. Our key
result is that performance is signicantly higher under a forced distribution
when workers work independently and may not easily harm each other. The
reason for this substantial gain in performance is that many supervisors in
the baseline setting are very lenient in their rating decisions and, hence,
performance incentives are weak. But even within the baseline setting those
supervisors who choose less lenient and more di¤erentiated ratings attain a
higher performance.
Moreover, we analyze the supervisors social preferences as potential drivers
of rating behavior. We nd that social preferences have a substantial impact
on rating behavior in the baseline setting. Particularly, altruistic supervisors
(as measured by simple choice experiments) tend to give higher bonuses while
equity oriented supervisors choose signicantly less di¤erentiated ratings.
However, our results also indicate potential problems of using a forced
distribution. First of all, it may be problematic to set up a forced distrib-
ution when employees have experienced a more liberal system of perfor-
mance evaluations before. Most importantly, we nd that introducing forced
distribution into an existing appraisal system leads to a short-term perfor-
mance increase, followed by a rather sharp drop in performance. Apparently,
while participants initially understand that they need to work harder under
a forced distribution, they are soon demotivated as they cannot attain the
good grades and high bonuses they have earned before. In contrast, some
experience with the forced distribution in the beginning demonstrates super-
visors the benets of di¤erentiation as they tend to di¤erentiate more and are
able to maintain a higher performance when forced distribution is abolished
again.
Our results have several interesting implications for the design of per-
formance evaluation schemes in practice. First of all, forced distribution
systems may indeed lead to performance increases as sometimes conjectured
by practitioners. However, our results also show that history matters, e.g.
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when changing the rules of performance evaluations, system designers have
to take the employeesas well as supervisorsreference standards and expec-
tations regarding appraisals and bonus payments into account. These have
been shaped by their previous experience and the way in which appraisals
have been assigned in the past. But these reference standards carry over to
the new system and a¤ect the social, economic and psychological mechanisms
at work in the appraisal process.
In additional treatments we extended our experimental set up by allow-
ing workers to temporarily prevent their coworkers from working on the task.
The interesting result of these additional treatments is that sabotage activ-
ities occur much more frequently when workers compete for higher bonuses
under forced distribution. This has detrimental consequences for overall
group performance. It is, of course, important to stress that we introduced
an anonymous and rather easy to use technology to sabotage coworkers
in the experiment. In eld settings, it is usually much harder to harm a
coworkers performance without being detected. Hence, we do not expect
equally substantial levels of counterproductive activities in rms in which
forced distributions are implemented. Nonetheless, given the strikingly high
frequency of participants using the sabotage option in our experiment, rms
should be careful in using forced distribution systems in work contexts where
mutually harmful counterproductive activities are easily accessible.
Our study, thus, sheds some light on the prevalent problem of subjective
performance evaluations in organizations and adds some empirical ndings to
the discussion on the e¤ectiveness of forced distribution systems. Of course,
there are still many further research questions. For example, it would be
interesting to study the robustness of our results for di¤erent and more com-
plex tasks or in settings where participants know each other well or can
communicate with each other.
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2.5 Appendix
Variables Pre-Round Group Group Group Number of
Group Output Output Timeout Rating Groups
Periods 1-8 9-16 1-8 9-16 1-8 9-16
Base 48.67 64.11 71.45 0.54 0.71 1.70 1.75 32
Fds 48.63 67.28 73.00 0.84 0.60 2.78 2.74 32
BaseCost 52.77 59.87 64.97 2.68 3.06 2.83 2.65 16
FdsCost 49.34 67.22 70.19 1.25 2.26 2.97 2.97 16
BaseSabo 50.75 48.54 54.18 0.77 0.71 2.00 1.84 16
FdsSabo 46.94 34.20 32.41 0.73 0.52 2.81 2.84 16
Table 2.11: Summary statistics of all treatments
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Figure 2.7: Real-e¤ort counting task in the experiment
Dependent Variable: Finished Correct False False/Correct
Blocks Blocks Blocks Blocks
Base vs. Fds (periods 1-8)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fds 1.951* 1.700** 0.251 -0.00087
(1.034) (0.803) (0.476) (0.0145)
Pre-Round Group Output 0.283*** 0.270*** 0.0125 -0.00010*
(0.0434) (0.0298) (0.0189) (0.0006)
Constant 17.62*** 14.04*** 3.580*** 0.209***
(2.234) (1.426) (1.016) (0.0332)
Observations 512 512 512 512
Number of Groups 64 64 64 64
Wald Chi2 626.24 756.05 13.63 19.53
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Random e¤ects regression (period dummies included)
Table 2.12: The performance e¤ect of forced distribution on di¤erent output
measures
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Dependent Variable: Group Output
Base vs. Fds BaseBase vs. FdsFds
(periods 1-8) (periods 9-16)
(1) (2)
Fds 12.83*** 21.47***
(4.964) (7.255)
Pre-Round Group Output 0.635*** 0.730***
(0.0610) (0.0974)
Fds  Pre-Round Group Output -0.198** -0.336**
(0.0941) (0.136)
Constant 21.47*** 37.22***
(3.043) (5.295)
Observations 512 256
Number of Groups 64 32
Wald Chi2 768.71 186.13
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Random e¤ects regression (period dummies included)
Table 2.13: The impact of forced distribution depending on ability
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Game A Game B
Pair I Pair II Pair I Pair II
Payo¤s (in e) for Player Payo¤s (in e) for Player
# 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
s 1 1.00 1.00 0.05 4.95 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
w 2 1.00 1.00 0.71 4.39 5.00 0.00 0.25 0.25
i 3 1.00 1.00 1.11 3.89 5.00 0.00 0.50 0.50
t 4 1.00 1.00 1.36 3.64 5.00 0.00 0.75 0.75
c 5 1.00 1.00 1.42 3.58 5.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
h 6 1.00 1.00 1.66 3.34 5.00 0.00 1.25 1.25
i 7 1.00 1.00 1.76 3.24 5.00 0.00 1.50. 1.50.
n 8 1.00 1.00 1.84 3.16 5.00 0.00 1.75 1.75
g 9 1.00 1.00 1.90 3.10 5.00 0.00 2.00 2.00
10 1.00 1.00 1.93 3.07 5.00 0.00 2.25 2.25
p 11 1.00 1.00 1.96 3.04 5.00 0.00 2.50 2.50
o 12 1.00 1.00 2.03 2.97 5.00 0.00 2.75 2.75
i 13 1.00 1.00 2.07 2.93 5.00 0.00 3.00 3.00
n 14 1.00 1.00 2.09 2.91 5.00 0.00 3.25 3.25
t 15 1.00 1.00 2.12 2.88 5.00 0.00 3.50 3.50
16 1.00 1.00 2.14 2.86 5.00 0.00 3.75 3.75
I 17 1.00 1.00 2.16 2.84 5.00 0.00 4.00 4.00
to 18 1.00 1.00 2.18 2.82 5.00 0.00 4.25 4.25
II 19 1.00 1.00 2.19 2.81 5.00 0.00 4.50 4.50
20 1.00 1.00 2.21 2.79 5.00 0.00 4.75 4.75
21 1.00 1.00 2.22 2.78 5.00 0.00 5.00 5.00
22 1.00 1.00 2.50 2.50 5.00 0.00 5.25 5.25
Table 2.16: Eliciting social preferences - "#" indicates the unique switching
point from pair I to pair II.
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Dependent Variable: Group Sabotaget+1
BaseSabo (periods 1-8) BaseSabo (periods 9-16)
(1) (2)
Span of Grades=1t 1.454* 0.254
(0.850) (0.766)
Span of Grades=2t 1.367 2.103***
(0.833) (0.773)
Span of Grades=3 or 4t 2.742 3.349**
(2.024) (1.569)
Group Outputt -0.0949*** -0.146***
(0.0297) (0.0373)
SD of Outputt -0.158 -0.235
(0.176) (0.194)
Pre-Round Group Output 0.0277 0.0574
(0.0586) (0.0468)
Constant 6.479** 8.862***
(3.096) (3.316)
Observations 128 112
Number of Groups 16 16
Wald Chi2 - -
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Random e¤ects regression (period dummies included)
Reference category: span of grades=0t
Table 2.18: The impact of deliberate di¤erentiation on sabotage activity
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Figure 2.7: Group outputs over time across treatments
when ratings are costly - in the last 8 periods
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Sample instructions for the rst part of the experiment
First Part
This is the beginning of part one of the experiment. Please read the
following instructions carefully. After having read the instructions you will
nd some test questions on your screen. The rst part of the experiment
starts as soon as all participants have answered all the questions correctly.
Summary
The rst part of the experiment consists of 8 rounds. Each round lasts two
and a half minutes. In each round there are 4 participants per group. The
group composition will be kept constant over the 8 rounds. No participant
will ever learn about the identity of any other participant in the group.
In this part of the experiment there are supervisors and workers. Out of
the 4 participants per group one has the role of the supervisor and the other
three are workers. The workers are denoted as Worker A, Worker Bor
Worker C. You will keep this name during the whole part.
Workers Task
Each of the 8 rounds follows the same rules: the workers task is identical
to the task in the pre-round. She/he repeatedly has to identify the correct
number of sevens in blocks of randomly generated numbers.
 Each block correctly solved is worth 2 points.
 Each wrong answer is worth -0.5 points, which means that if you
state a wrong number of sevens there will be a penalty of half a point.
The number of correct and wrong answers results in the workers total
points of the round. The minimum number of points per round is zero which
means that one cannot get a negative result.
As in the pre-round the worker can always press the timeout button.
If this button is used the workers screen is locked for 20 seconds. During
this time he cannot enter an answer. The time for the round keeps running
during the timeout. So the worker loses 20 seconds per timeout since she/he
cannot work on a block during this time. Please note that you cannot take
a timeout during the last 20 seconds of a round.
Supervisors Task
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At the end of each round the supervisor gets to know the following for
each worker in his group:
 The number of blocks correctly solved
 The number of wrong answers
 The resulting number of points
Then the supervisor rates the workers on a scale from 1 to 5, while 1 is
the best (highest) and 5 is the worst (lowest) grade.
[Only FDS: Note: Each supervisor has to rate one of the workers with
1or 2, another one with 3and one with 4or 5after each round.]
After the supervisor has completed her/his rating the workers get to know
the following:
 The number of tasks correctly solved and number of wrong answers
by herself/himself and the other workers in the group
 The resulting points
 The own rating (not those of the others)
 The own frequency of pushing the timeout-button
 The own payment for the round
Payment
Please note: Even though the amount is displayed after each round only
one of the 8 rounds will actually be paid out. The payo¤-relevant round
will be publicly allotted at the end of the experiment. As the round will
be randomly identied each of the eight rounds could be relevant for your
payment which you will receive for the rst part of the experiment.
Supervisors Payment
The supervisors payment is solely determined by the points achieved
by his/her workers in the round. For each point achieved by a worker the
supervisor gets 30 cents.
Workers Payment
The workers payment is determined by the rating assigned by the super-
visor for the round:
For the grade 1 the worker would receive 10 Euros, for a 2 7.50 Euros,
for a 3 5 Euros, for a 4 2.50 Euros and for a 5 0 Euro.
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Rating Payment
1 10.00 e
2 7.50 e
3 5.00 e
4 2.50 e
5 0.00 e
In addition to that the payment is determined by the frequency of pushing
the timeout-button. Per usage of the timeout-buttonthe worker gets 25
cents.
If there are any questions left please raise your hand. We will then come
to your cabin.
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Chapter 3
Heterogeneous Contestants and
the Intensity of Tournaments -
an Empirical Investigation1
3.1 Introduction
Tournaments where agents ght for a limited set of given prizes are om-
nipresent in day-to-day situations. One can for example observe promotion
tournaments, competition for bonus pools (Baker et al. (1994), Rosen (1986),
Rajan and Reichelstein (2006)) or tournaments concerning market shares and
litigation contests between them (see for example Taylor (2003), Wärneryd
(2000)). Also beauty contests, singing contests and sports competitions have
the structure of tournaments (Amegashie (2009), Szymanski (2003)).2
As Lazear and Rosen (1981) have shown in their seminal article, rank-
order tournaments can -under certain conditions- be the optimal design to
induce rst best e¤ort levels if only ordinal information is available at rea-
sonable costs. However, theory predicts that incentives are lower in hetero-
geneous tournaments, i.e. when contestants considerably di¤er with respect
to ability or skill. In heterogeneous tournaments the underdog will shy away
1This chapter is based upon Berger and Nieken (2010).
2For an overview about tournaments and contests see for example Konrad (2009).
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from competition as his chances of winning are comparably low. The oppo-
nent will anticipate this reduction of costly e¤ort and decide to hold back
e¤ort as well. As a result, overall performance and, hence, the intensity of
the tournament decreases. This e¤ect is called the contamination hypothesis
(e.g. Bach et al. (2009)). Since in practice contestants are seldom com-
pletely homogeneous, this prediction calls the frequent use and e¤ectiveness
of tournament schemes in rms and organizations into question. While the
logic and e¤ects of heterogeneous tournaments have been studied intensely in
the theoretical literature (see among others Kräkel and Sliwka (2004)), only
recently a growing body of papers test the theoretical predictions with non-
experimental eld data from sports contests (for instance Frick et al. (2008),
Bach et al. (2009), for experimental evidence see Schotter and Weigelt (1992)
or Harbring et al. (2007)).
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is twofold: First,
we analyze the impact of heterogeneity on the incentive e¤ects of tourna-
ments, using data from the TOYOTA Handball-Bundesliga.3 We are the
rst to test the contamination hypothesis with data from handball, a game
that provides measures necessary to test this particular prediction. We have
collected data of two seasons, containing information on goals and fouls as
well as ranks and odds from sports betting. Betting odds provide an excellent
measure of the teams current ability as they contain all available information
such as standings, recent performances, player injuries or transfers right be-
fore each game. They allow us to derive ex-ante winning probabilities which
we then use to determine the heterogeneity of the match up. Furthermore,
we use the number of 2-minute suspensions to approximate the intensity of
the game. Our results conrm the contamination hypothesis and show that
tournaments between heterogeneous contestants are signicantly less intense.
The results are robust to di¤erent measures of heterogeneity and sub sample
analyses of the data. Second, we show that the overall decrease in game
intensity is almost entirely driven by the reaction of the favorite team, i.e.
3Note that we, as well as Frick et al. (2008), consider the team as a unit and there-
fore rely on two-players models such as Lazear and Rosen (1981) instead of collective
tournament models.
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the favorite plays signicantly less intense in asymmetric games while the
underdog does not cease to exert e¤ort against all odds. In addition, we
test if our proxy for game intensity is a suitable measure for our analysis. In
line with the intuition that teams who put forth extra e¤ort on the defensive
end should be more likely to win, we nd that the number of 2-minute sus-
pensions is positively linked to the winning probability of the corresponding
team.
3.2 Related Literature
Since objective measures for workersabilities as well as e¤ort or performance
di¤erences are rarely available, non-experimental eld evidence on the conta-
mination hypothesis is quite scarce. Studying professional sports data may
help to ll this gap as sports contests often resemble very standardized tour-
nament settings between two parties of which ability and performance proxies
may be derived from game statistics. However, the studies which tested the
contamination hypothesis with sports data do not provide unambiguous evi-
dence in favor of it. Among the rst studies, Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990)
analyze PGA golf tournaments and cannot clearly conrm the contamina-
tion hypothesis. They show that the stronger the opponent, the weaker the
performance of a player. While this is in line with theory for participants per-
forming below average, it violates theory for participants performing above
average as they should be motivated by a higher quality opponent. Brown
(2011) also uses data from PGA golf tournaments from 1999-2006 and shows
that e¤ort declines if a superstar (Tiger Woods) participates in the tourna-
ment. However, her ndings are only signicant for higher-skilled players but
not for lower-skilled ones. Horse race studies like Lynch (2005) support the
contamination hypothesis as does Sunde (2009) using tennis data. He also
conducts a separate analysis for favorites and underdogs and nds that only
underdogs are sensitive towards heterogeneity and reduce e¤ort. In contrast
to our paper, all these papers study individual sports. Bach et al. (2009)
analyze data from the Olympic Rowing Regatta 2000 for teams and single
skulls. They report higher e¤ort levels in homogeneous groups, but also nd
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that only the favorites and not the underdogs react to heterogeneity. Bach
et al. attribute this nding to the Olympic spirit which might motivate un-
derdogs to do their best, irrespective their chances of success. Closest to our
paper is the work of Frick et al. (2008) and Nieken and Stegh (2010). Frick
et al. use data from the German soccer league. Employing betting odds to
measure heterogeneity and red and yellow cards as proxies for e¤ort, their
main nding is in line with our results.
In this paper we go one step further and take the dynamic structure of
tournaments into account by analyzing the teamsintensity of play separately
for each half of the game. Our results show that ex-ante ability di¤erences
not only determine the intensity of a match at the beginning of the tourna-
ment but also towards the end, irrespective the halftime score. Nieken and
Stegh analyze the e¤ects of heterogeneity in the German Hockey League.
Here, the number of minor suspensions also declines if contestants di¤er in
their abilities. In contrast to our ndings, they cannot conrm the contam-
ination hypothesis for each third of the game separately. While we provide
evidence that 2-minute suspensions may serve as a proxy for game intensity
in handball, the previous mentioned work neglect this proof for their data.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section
describes the data set and our key variables. In section 3.4 we present our
results and discuss our ndings. Section 3.5 concludes the paper.
3.3 The Data
In our study we use professional sports data from the rst "TOYOTAHandball-
Bundesliga", the major handball league in Germany.4 Our data set comprises
all 612 league games from the seasons 2006/2007 and 2007/2008. For each
game and each halftime we collected detailed information on the goals scored
and penalties committed by both teams. We also gathered statistics on the
number of spectators, size of venues and the two referees in charge of the
game. Even though handball has become the second most popular sport
4The data are made publicly available and are downloadable in pdf-format under
https://www.toyota-handball-bundesliga.de
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in Germany5, handball is still rather unknown outside European boarders.
For the ease of comprehension, the next section briey addresses the most
important rules of the game.
3.3.1 The Game of Handball
In handball6 two teams, each consisting of one goalkeeper and six eld play-
ers, compete for two 30 minutes halves. By bouncing, passing and ultimately
throwing a small ball into the goal of the opposing team, the team outscoring
the opponent wins. In each season all 18 teams play every other team twice,
once at home and once away. This amounts to a total of 34 league games for
each team in each season. For each game, the winning team earns two cham-
pionship points while the defeated team receives none. In case of a tie the
two points are split up equally. The championship points determine the nal
league standing at the end of the season while the team with the most points
wins the national title. In principle, all 9 top ranked teams may qualify for
a European contest in the upcoming season7 and up to three teams may lose
their spot in the rst national league. Since almost all nal ranks have thus
direct implications for the nancial future of the ball club, incentives to win
additional games are given throughout the entire season.
3.3.2 Heterogeneity Measures
The key independent variable needed to test our main hypothesis concerns
the heterogeneity of the two agents (teams) competing in the tournament.8
Intuitively, di¤erences in team abilities should be reected by di¤erences in
5Among 1046 Germans, 40.7% respondents named handball the second most popular
sport after soccer, followed by track and eld and tennis with roughly 25% and 20%
(Statista.de 2009).
6Handball is also known as team handball, Olympic handball or European handball.
Note that American handball is a completely di¤erent game.
7This is the case when German teams have won all three European titles in the previous
season as it happened in 2006/2007.
8We consider each game as a separate contest. As argued above, we believe that each
game is important in itself. In our analysis we, however, try to control for seasonal trends
and do separate regressions for di¤erent sections of the season.
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current league standing. This measure may, however, yield noisy estimates
early in the season when rankings usually uctuate by a lot, not reecting true
abilities. Taking the di¤erence in nal rankings instead, one would assume
constant ability di¤erences over the course of season and ignore potential
ups and downs caused by injuries or player transfers during the season. A
more e¢ cient indicator for ability di¤erences between two teams can be de-
rived from sport betting odds (see Fama (1970), Camerer (1989), Woodland
and Woodland (1994), Levitt (2004) or Forrest et al. (2005) for a discussion
about market e¢ ciency in betting markets). Betting odds should be able
to capture within-seasonal uctuations of team ability more accurately than
rankings. As Frick et al. (2008) and Deutscher et al. (2009), we use bet-
ting odds to proxy heterogeneity. Following their approach, we calculate the
implicit winning probabilities of the respective teams based on betting odds
from betexplorer.de. Taking the absolute di¤erence of these probabilities re-
sults is our preferred measure of the match ups heterogeneity: "Het_Odds".
This measure can take on any value between 0 (very homogeneous) and 1
(very heterogeneous contestants). The average in the sample corresponds to
0.49.9
3.3.3 E¤ort Measures
The other key variable needed to test the contamination hypotheses in our
setting is team e¤ort. The fact that the e¤ort choice of the observational
unit in a tournament is usually not directly observable poses a major empir-
ical problem for testing the incentive e¤ects of tournaments. In contrast to
most rm data sets, sports data usually o¤er a larger amount of statistics.
However, it is not always straightforward to decide upon which best reect
individual or team e¤ort. Frick et al. (2008), for instance, argue that team
e¤ort in soccer is hard to measure with statistics kept on the o¤ensive end
of the game. The number of scored goals during a soccer match may not
serve as a good proxy for team e¤ort as scoring may simply result from a
9For a more detailed description please see the appendix or Frick et al. (2008) and
Deutscher et al. (2009))
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lack of defensive e¤ort by the opposing team. The same argument holds for
the game of handball. Similar to Frick et al. (2008), we believe overall team
e¤ort is - in our case - more accurately approximated by the e¤ort put forth
in defense which may be best captured by foul statistics.
Unlike in soccer, a foul in handball is not automatically considered unfair.
In general, handball is considered a very physical game. Defensive players
are allowed to stop the opponent by using body contact when they are in
between the attacking player and their own goal. Even though the play is
then interrupted and the o¤ensive team regains possession of the ball, such
a "fault" is considered a good defensive e¤ort and is not penalized. In fact,
if the defensive team can prevent the o¤ense with "faults" from scoring for
a long enough time, the referee may eventually call "passive play" urging
the o¤ensive team to wrap up its o¤ensive e¤ort. In this case, the defense is
likely to prevent a goal and to get a chance to score themselves on the next
possession. Harsher defensive attacks are, however, usually sanctioned by 2-
minute suspensions. The player who committed the foul is then temporarily
suspended from the game and leaves his team playing a man down for the
next 120 seconds.10 2-minute suspensions are considered part of the game as
they occur roughly 8 times during an average league game. They are thus
more frequently ruled than yellow cards in soccer and should therefore be
less prone to measurement errors such as poor referee judgments.
In our analysis 2-minute suspensions will serve as our proxy for team
e¤ort or the intensity of play. The idea behind this is as follows: A team
who tries particularly hard to prevent the o¤ensive team from scoring will
play very physical defense. Often this additional e¤ort on the defensive end
will successfully prevent goals without players being sent o¤ the court by
the referees. However, sometimes these defensive attacks will be just outside
the tolerated norm and result in a 2-minute suspension. Teams that lack
defensive e¤ort do not defend aggressively and are thus generally less likely
to commit penalties.
One could also think of 2-minute suspensions as a proxy of destructive
10Each player may only receive two 2-minute suspensions. For his third 2-minute sus-
pensions, he automatically receives a red card and is suspended for the rest of the game.
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sabotage activity rather than e¤ort. Nevertheless, subtle sabotage activi-
ties that successfully prevent goals and remain undetected in the majority of
cases could also be considered good defensive e¤ort. Fouling itself, without
increasing gooddefensive e¤orts, is unlikely to be a rationale strategy as
sabotage activities are likely to be detected by the referees. A team who
decides to play illegal defense without increasing defensive e¤orts will con-
stantly loose players due to 2-minute suspensions and thereby give up chances
to win. Similar, if penalties were the result of frustration or a lack of good
defensive e¤ort, teams with more suspensions would be more likely to lose. In
contrast to this, chapter 3.3 shows that more suspensions are associated with
a higher likelihood to win. We therefore believe that 2-minute suspensions
are more likely to be a by-productof high defensive e¤ort rather than just
an indicator of sabotage.
Since we cannot perfectly rule out that 2-minute suspensions also capture
tendencies to sabotage the other team, we interpret total 2-minute suspen-
sions per game as an indicator for the intensity of the gamerather than
joint team e¤orts.11
Table 3.5 in the appendix provides summary statistics on the committed
penalties as well as the main independent variables included in our upcoming
analysis.
3.4 Results
In this section we present our main results. At rst, we test if the intensity
of the game is indeed predicted by the heterogeneity of the particular match
up. In section 3.4.2 we report separate analysis on how ex-ante favorites
and ex-ante underdogs react to ability di¤erences in tournaments. Section
3.4.3 validates our measure of play intensity by explaining the outcome of
the game by the number of 2-minute suspensions ruled against each team.
11Note that according to tournament theory, not only e¤orts but also sabotage activity
should decrease in the heterogeneity of the tournament. Thus, even if penalties are a
proxy for sabotage rather than e¤ort or a mixture of both, theory would still predict less
penalties in asymmetric contests.
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Figure 3.1: The relation between heterogeneity (based on betting odds) and
the number of 2-minute suspensions
3.4.1 The Impact of Heterogeneity on the Intensity of
the Game
A rst descriptive picture on the relation between penalties and ability dif-
ferences is given in gure 3.1.12 The negative slope of the tted value line is
in support of the contamination hypothesis and reveals that the number of
penalties indeed decreases in the heterogeneity of the match up. Of course,
this conclusion may be far-fetched as it is only based on correlations without
any further controls.
To investigate this relation in more detail, we apply regression analysis.
As our dependent variable, i.e. the sum of 2-minute suspensions, is a count
variable, we use Poisson regressions throughout our analysis.13 Our main
12Note that as the data is count data, we used the Stata option jitter to make data
points visible that would lie on top of each other otherwise.
13Figure 3.3 in the appendix shows that our dependent variable follows a poisson dis-
tribution. As shown in table 3.5, the variance of our dependent variable is only slightly
larger than its mean, indicating that overdispersion is not a problem in our estimations.
However, our results are also robust to other count model specications such as negative
binomial regressions as well as simple OLS regressions.
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independent variable is the heterogeneity of the two contestants which is ap-
proximated by the absolute di¤erence in winning probabilities (Het_Odds).
For robustness checks, we alternatively use the absolute di¤erence in nal
(Het_Final Rank) or current league standings (Het_Current Rank) as prox-
ies for heterogeneity. Besides di¤erences in team abilities, we control for
several other factors that are also likely to a¤ect the intensity of a game: As
in any other team sport, certain match ups are more important for teams and
fans than others. Such games usually take place between two local rivals and
are referred to as "derbies". Since these games might in general be fought
more intensely, we include a dummy variable (Derby) taking on the value 1 if
a game can be classied as a derby and 0 otherwise.14 Second, as pointed out
in previous studies, the atmosphere created by fans could a¤ect the players
actions on the court (see for instance Dohmen (2008)). Therefore, we addi-
tionally control for the absolute number of spectators attending the game as
well as the percentage of taken seats. Given that some handball venues are
much smaller than others, the latter variable gives us a better estimate on
how relative attendance, e.g. if the venue is sold out, a¤ects the intensity
of the game. As certain teams might on average be more likely to commit
fouls than other, dummy variables for both competing teams are included.
To account for the course of the season, a dummy variable indicating the last
18 games of the season, a dummy indicating season 2007/2008 and a dummy
of the interaction of the two (the last 18 games in the season 2007/2008) are
added.15 Finally, we also control for referee xed e¤ects in our estimations.
Table 3.1 displays our main results. Irrespective of the heterogeneity mea-
sure applied, we have highly signicant evidence that the intensity of the con-
test - approximated by the sum of 2-minute suspensions per game - decreases
in the heterogeneity of the match up. Holding all other variables constant,
a one standard deviation higher absolute di¤erence in winning probabilities
of roughly 26%, is associated with a 7.6% decrease in the expected sum of
14We dene a game as a derby if the cities of the two opposing teams are within 150
kilometer distance.
15We also ran regressions in which we included dummy variables for each day a match
took place. Since it did not change our main results, we decided not to include these
additional 60 dummies.
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Dependent Variable: Sum of 2-Minute Suspensions
(1) (2) (3)
Het_Odds -0.3078***
(0.068)
Het_Final Rank -0.0233***
(0.004)
Het_Current Rank -0.0141***
(0.004)
Derby 0.0854** 0.0739* 0.0915**
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
Taken seats in % 0.1164 0.1073 0.0920
(0.098) (0.098) (0.101)
Spectators/1000 0.0047 0.0032 0.0086
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant 2.0585*** 2.1583*** 2.0107***
(0.124) (0.128) (0.130)
Observations 612 612 594
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 0.08
Log pseudolikelihood -1448.99 -1445.36 -1411.50
Poisson estimations, robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, Further controls: referee dummies,
home and away team dummies, season 2007/2008 (0/1), last
18 games of season (0/1), last 18 games in season 2007/2008 (0/1)
Table 3.1: The e¤ect of heterogeneity on 2-minute suspensions
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2-minute suspensions.16 Similar, a one standard deviation larger di¤erence
in nal standings (roughly 4 ranks) decreases the expected count of penalties
by 9.2%. Moreover, penalties are more often ruled in games between two
local rivals.
In table 3.6 in the appendix we opt for a nonparametric functional form
of our main independent variable to allow for non-linearity of the e¤ect.
Here, we regress the dependent variable on the 2nd to 5th quintiles of our
heterogeneity measures with the lowest quintile of heterogeneity being the
reference category in all three specications. The results show that the num-
ber of penalties constantly decreases in the degree of the heterogeneity of the
match up. While column 2 and 3 suggest a rather linear relation between
league standings and performance, the decrease in performance is somewhat
convex when considering winning probabilities. Moving from the 1st to the
2nd quintile of winning probability di¤erences, game intensity is only slightly
and insignicantly smaller. However, the di¤erence between the 1st and 5th
quintile is highly signicant and much larger than the signicant di¤erence
between 1st and 4th quintile. Observing a game in the highest quintile of
our heterogeneity measure Het_Odds (which on average corresponds to an
80% di¤erence in winning probabilities) as opposed to a game in the lowest
quintile of heterogeneity (which on average corresponds to a 13% di¤erence in
winning probabilities) decreases the expected count of suspensions by roughly
26%. A game in the 4th quintile, as opposed to one in the 1st, still decreases
expected suspensions by 15%.17
In table 3.7 in the appendix we analyze the impact of heterogeneity on
game intensity separately for each half of the game. One could argue that
ex-ante ability di¤erences become less important over the course of the game,
as the halftime score provides both teams with a meaningful update of their
current ability di¤erences and the respective winning probabilities. We nd
that the number of suspensions signicantly decreases in ability di¤erences
not only in the rst but also in the second half. The e¤ect of ex-ante ability
16To compute the percentage change in the expected count of our dependent variable,
we use Statas listcoef-package written by J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese.
17The di¤erences between the coe¢ cients of the 5th and the 4th as well as the 4th and
the 3rd quintile are signicant.
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di¤erences is indeed somewhat smaller in the second 30 minutes. While a
standard deviation increase in heterogeneity decreases the expected count of
suspensions by 8.6% in the rst half, the e¤ect decreases to 6.2% in the second
half.18 The insignicant coe¢ cient of "Halftime Score" further indicates that
additional information on winning probabilities introduced by performance
di¤erences in the rst half does not seem to a¤ect game intensity in the
second half of the tournament.19
One may argue that including all games of the season in the analysis is
inappropriate as incentives to win could di¤er with respect to the progress
made during the season.20 Since we have considered each game as a separate
contest, we do not fully account for the fact that each game is also embedded
in a bigger contest, i.e. the championship race. Even though we argued that
teams have considerable incentives to win games irrespective their current
rank, we try to account for this simplication in our analysis by separately
analyzing games in the rst and in the second half of the season. If games
toward the end of the season were perceived more or less important, the
inuence of heterogeneity should also vary across both sub samples. However,
the coe¢ cient of our main variable Het_Odds remains virtually identical
and signicant in both sub samples, suggesting that our main result is not
sensitive to the round of play.21
Overall, we believe our results provide rather strong evidence in favor of
the contamination hypothesis as predicted by economic theory (Lazear and
Rosen (1981)) and conrmed by similar recent empirical studies (e.g. Frick
et al. (2008), Bach et al. (2009) or Nieken and Stegh (2010)).
18However, the di¤erence between both coe¢ cients is not signicant.
19Note that "Het_Odds" and "Halftime Score" are highly correlated. However, even if
we exclude Het_Odds from the estimation, the di¤erence in goals at the half has only a
marginal signicant impact on the suspensions ruled in the second half. Also the interac-
tion of the two variables is insignicant.
20One could think that heterogeneity has a smaller e¤ect late in the season when rankings
are more certain than in the beginning.
21Regression tables are available upon request.
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3.4.2 The Impact of Heterogeneity on Favorites and
Underdogs
According to theory (see for instance Kräkel and Sliwka (2004)), favorites and
underdogs22 should not react di¤erently to the heterogeneity of the match
up. In games with heterogeneous contestants, the underdog has only little
chances to win and should therefore refrain from providing much e¤ort. The
favorite should anticipate this reduction and lower his e¤ort as well. Simi-
lar predictions can be derived regarding the sabotage activities of favorites
and underdogs. As experimental studies have shown, underdogs often exert
higher e¤ort levels than theoretically predicted while the behavior in symmet-
ric settings is roughly in line with theory (see Bull et al. (1987), Schotter and
Weigelt (1992)). While Weigelt et al. (1989) nd no signicant di¤erences
when comparing e¤ort levels of favorites and underdogs in unfair tourna-
ments, Harbring and Luenser (2008) report that e¤orts of weak players are
signicantly higher than in symmetric settings if the prize spread is high. In
a real e¤ort experiment of van Dijk et al. (2001) players with lower ability
try to win the tournament against a high ability contestant even though they
lose in most cases and could avoid the tournament by playing a piece rate
scheme.
Regarding sports data, the results are somewhat mixed. While Sunde
(2009) shows that underdogs react stronger to heterogeneity than favorites,
Bach et al. (2009) and Nieken and Stegh (2010) nd the opposite. In their
studies the favorite lowers his e¤ort in more heterogeneous contests but the
e¤ort of the underdog remains nearly unchanged. One may argue that in
sports, the general norm suggests not to give up irrespective the size of
the decit. In team sports this norm might be even more prominent as
players do not want to let their teammates and coaches down. From an
individual players perspective, giving up could also result in being put to
the bench in the next game. In contrast, the favorite team may dare to
lower e¤ort without risking social sanctions associated with a loss. Indeed
the ex-ante favorite teams end up winning 75% of the sampled games. We
22We dene favorites and underdogs according to the betting odds for each game.
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Figure 3.2: The relation between heterogeneity (based on betting odds) and
2-minute suspensions of favorites and underdogs
therefore expect favorites to be more willing to withhold e¤ort (and sabotage)
in heterogeneous contests than underdogs.
In gure 3.2 we show a scatter plot of committed 2-minute suspensions
and the heterogeneity of the match up (Het_Odds) separately for favorites
and underdogs. The picture seems to support the results found in Bach et al.
(2009) and Nieken and Stegh (2010) as the favoritesnumber of penalties are
substantially lower in heterogeneous contests while the right panel of gure
3.2 shows no systematic pattern for the underdogs. The overall decrease in
the gamesintensities, previously shown in gure 3.1, thus seems to be driven
by the adjustments of the stronger contestants.
To conrm this impression, we run separate regressions for favorites and
underdogs explaining the teamscommitted penalties by the heterogeneity
of the match up. Except for the dependent variable, the specications in
columns (1) and (3) are identical to our previous specication in table 3.2.
In columns (2) and (4) we additionally test the linearity of the e¤ect by re-
gressing our dependent variable on the quintiles of our heterogeneity measure.
The results indeed show that only the ex-ante favorite reacts to heterogeneity
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by reducing the intensity of his play.
The coe¢ cient in column (1) suggests that a one standard deviation in-
crease in our measure "Het_Odds" reduces the expected count of 2-minute
suspension of the favorite team by roughly 11%. Column (2) indicates that
the favorites reaction to the heterogeneity is monotone as indicated by the
growing economic and statistical signicance of higher quintile coe¢ cients.
However, the drop in e¤ort is particularly pronounced in very heterogeneous
games as the coe¢ cient for the 5th quintile is again nearly twice the size of the
coe¢ cient for the 4th quintile. On average, the favorites expected penalties
are about 34% lower when the di¤erence in the ex-ante winning probabilities
falls into the 5th quintile as opposed to the 1st quintile. Interestingly, the
coe¢ cient for "Derby" is highly signicant in both estimations, suggesting
that favorites are willing to sacrice additional e¤ort when playing against
one of their rivals. Columns (3) and (4) reveal that the underdogs play is
hardly a¤ected by ex-ante ability di¤erences as all coe¢ cients are econom-
ically and statistically insignicant. Table 3.8 in the appendix shows that
this result is also reected in the raw data. For the favorite, the average
number of penalties decreases from 4.2 in the 1st to 2.9 in the 5th quintile
of heterogeneity. For the underdog, the respective decrease ranges only from
4.6 to 4.3.
This nding is in line with Bach et al. (2009) and Nieken and Stegh (2010)
but stands in sharp contrast to standard tournament theory. As mentioned
above, this result may be attributed to social costs faced by inferior con-
testants for giving up. A similar argument is brought forward in a recent
study by Fershtman and Gneezy (2011). In their eld experiment the major-
ity of students participating in running tournaments are unwilling to quit or
drop out of the contest even when their prospects to win become negligible.
Some suggestive evidence for the existence of social sanctions imposed
by the fans comes from table 3.9 in the appendix. Here we run separate
regressions explaining the intensity put forth by the favorite during home
and away games. The coe¢ cient of "Het_Odds" in column (3) shows that
the reduction of game intensity in heterogeneous matches seems larger when
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Dependent Variable: 2-Minute Suspensions
Favorite Underdog
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Het_Odds -0.4559*** 0.0514
(0.106) (0.098)
2nd Quintile -0.0061 -0.0750
(0.056) (0.051)
3rd Quintile -0.1377** 0.0024
(0.060) (0.052)
4th Quintile -0.2159*** -0.0159
(0.069) (0.060)
5th Quintile -0.4154*** -0.0665
(0.082) (0.074)
Derby 0.1349** 0.1277** 0.0654 0.0651
(0.059) (0.059) (0.050) (0.049)
Seats taken in% 0.1003 0.0892 0.0871 0.0842
(0.106) (0.107) (0.099) (0.099)
Spectators/1000 -0.0166* -0.0145 -0.0007 0.0022
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Constant 1.2104*** 1.1716*** 1.4272*** 1.4506***
(0.174) (0.173) (0.154) (0.152)
Observations 612 612 612 612
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07
Log pseudolikelihood -1153.01 -1149.55 -1189.80 -1188.74
Poisson estimations, robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, Further controls: referee dummies,
home and away team dummies, season 2007/2008 (0/1), last
18 games of season (0/1), last 18 games in season 2007/2008 (0/1)
Table 3.2: The e¤ect of heterogeneity on 2-minute suspensions of favorites
and underdogs
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the favorite does not play in front of the home crowd. The coe¢ cients of
all quintiles of heterogeneity are larger and more signicant at away games,
but the di¤erences across both sub samples are not quite signicant when
introducing interaction terms into a pooled estimation.
3.4.3 Testing our Measure of Game Intensity
How do we know that the number of 2-minute suspensions really serves as a
good measure of game intensity? Increasing the intensity of play by putting
forth more defensive e¤ort and/or clever sabotage activities should, on av-
erage, increase a teams probability to win. If the number of suspensions is
a result of these activities, more suspensions should be positively associated
with the teams probability to win as well. If instead the number of suspen-
sions reects a lack of good defensive e¤ort or the level of frustration, one
would expect to see a negative relationship between penalties and winning
probabilities as the team has to play a man down whenever a suspension is
ruled.23
To validate our measure of game intensity, table 3.3 explains the outcome
of the game by the share of penalties (0-100%) ruled against the ex-ante
favorite team.24 In specications (1-4) our dependent variable is the di¤er-
ence in goals, i.e. the goals scored by the favorite team minus the goals
scored by the underdog, while columns (5-8) explain the likelihood that the
favorite team wins. If our line of thought is correct, an increase in the share
of 2-minute suspensions should lead to a more favorable outcome for the
corresponding team. This reasoning is partially conrmed in column (1) in
which we explain the di¤erence in scored goals using a simple OLS regres-
sion. Controlling for ex-ante winning probabilities and team xed e¤ects, the
share of 2-minutes suspensions ruled against the favorite team has a positive
and marginally signicant impact on the di¤erence in goals.
23However, results from soccer for instance indicate that even the permanent expulsion
of a player does not necessarily lead to a disadvantage for the a¤ected team (e.g. Caliendo
and Radic (2006)).
24Note that the denominator of this measure already accounts for the overall intensity
of the game as well as the number of fouls committed by the underdog.
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In column (2) we again test for the linearity of this e¤ect and see that the
best outcome is achieved when the share of penalties rises to the 4th quintile.
In specications (3) and (4) we repeat the previous estimations but restrict
our sample to the 50% most homogeneous games. In these games, a teams
marginal e¤ort should have the largest impact on the outcome of the game.
In the remaining games, ex-ante ability di¤erences may be so large that the
outcome of the game is hardly a¤ected by e¤ort or sabotage. Indeed, we nd
a much stronger and highly signicant e¤ect of the share of penalties on the
di¤erence in scored goals among homogeneous games. The linear estimate
suggests that when the favorites share of penalties increases by 20%, the
di¤erence in scored goals improves by 1.3 goals.
However, a teams e¤ort or sabotage activities should be primarily di-
rected toward winning the game and not toward outscoring the opponent
by many goals. A more appropriate way to validate our measure is there-
fore to test its direct impact on the teams winning probability. Again, a
simple descriptive statistic seems to su¢ ce to support our argument. In the
games which were won by the favorite, the average share of suspensions ruled
against the favorite amounts to 46.4%, while in the games that were lost this
number corresponds to 44.5%. In specication (5-8) of table 3.3 we further
test this di¤erence by regressing a dummy variable taking on the value 1
if the favorite team wins and 0 otherwise on the share of penalties and the
control variables used in the previous specication. In specication (5-6) we
again include all games in the analysis while (7-8) only include the most ho-
mogeneous games. The displayed coe¢ cients are the marginal e¤ects from
a probit regression. Again the share of 2-minute suspensions ruled against
the favorite signicantly relates to the winning probability. The coe¢ cient
in column (6) implies that teams with a 10% higher share of 2-minute sus-
pensions are 2.6% more likely to win. In homogeneous games this e¤ect is
almost 3 times as large.25 The results in column (6) and (8) again imply that
the e¤ect of the share of 2-minute suspensions is more or less linear. The
coe¢ cient for the 5th quintile, however, indicates that committing too many
25Among the 50% most homogeneous games, the favorite committed 51% of the penalties
in the games he won and only 44% in the games which were lost.
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penalties may eventually reverse this positive e¤ect. Being too aggressive
and thus committing too many fouls in relation to fair tackles will eventually
harm the team.
Summing up, table 3.3 provides direct evidence that the number of 2-
minute suspensions indeed reect the intensity of play of a handball team
which is reassuring for our reported main results. Note, however, that the
interpretation of this result is unlikely to be that a team can increase its
prospects to win by simply committing more fouls. Instead, teams who exert
a lot of defensive e¤ort are more likely to win but also more likely to commit
fouls than teams who do not try hard to defend at all.
80
D
ep
en
de
nt
V
ar
ia
bl
e:
G
oa
ls
Fa
vo
ri
te
-G
oa
ls
U
nd
er
do
g
1
if
Fa
vo
ri
te
W
in
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
A
ll
G
am
es
L
ow
H
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
A
ll
G
am
es
L
ow
H
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
2-
M
in
ut
es
Sh
ar
e
Fa
vo
ri
te
0.
02
55
*
0.
06
34
**
*
0.
00
26
**
0.
00
74
**
*
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
02
)
2n
d
Q
ui
nt
ile
0.
93
15
1.
98
89
*
0.
04
07
0.
12
97
(0
.6
42
)
(1
.0
54
)
(0
.0
48
)
(0
.0
93
)
3r
d
Q
ui
nt
ile
0.
32
08
1.
70
38
*
0.
08
03
*
0.
20
28
**
(0
.5
76
)
(0
.9
14
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.0
85
)
4t
h
Q
ui
nt
ile
1.
66
31
**
2.
42
01
**
0.
12
08
**
*
0.
31
79
**
*
(0
.7
81
)
(1
.1
46
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
71
)
5t
h
Q
ui
nt
ile
1.
19
82
*
2.
76
80
**
*
0.
07
00
0.
20
81
**
(0
.6
76
)
(0
.9
03
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
86
)
T
ak
en
se
at
s
in
%
0.
10
61
0.
07
50
1.
03
37
0.
78
63
0.
10
02
0.
08
66
0.
17
77
0.
04
22
(1
.1
58
)
(1
.1
75
)
(1
.8
95
)
(1
.9
12
)
(0
.1
18
)
(0
.1
19
)
(0
.2
20
)
(0
.2
13
)
Sp
ec
ta
to
rs
/1
00
0
0.
07
25
0.
08
53
-0
.2
03
8
-0
.1
80
0
-0
.0
15
7*
-0
.0
14
9*
-0
.0
36
8*
*
-0
.0
28
2*
(0
.0
94
)
(0
.0
93
)
(0
.1
42
)
(0
.1
41
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
16
)
D
er
by
-0
.7
63
2
-0
.7
58
9
-0
.1
01
8
-0
.0
75
8
-0
.0
36
0
-0
.0
48
8
0.
06
26
0.
05
99
(0
.6
40
)
(0
.6
43
)
(0
.9
44
)
(0
.9
52
)
(0
.0
62
)
(0
.0
64
)
(0
.1
10
)
(0
.1
04
)
H
et
_
O
dd
s
8.
51
06
**
*
8.
39
53
**
*
6.
69
86
**
*
6.
73
14
**
*
0.
52
79
**
*
0.
51
59
**
*
0.
71
03
**
*
0.
63
90
**
(1
.1
61
)
(1
.1
74
)
(2
.3
34
)
(2
.3
65
)
(0
.0
98
)
(0
.0
98
)
(0
.2
69
)
(0
.2
62
)
C
on
st
an
t
-5
.1
78
7*
-4
.8
53
9*
-7
.7
31
8*
*
-6
.6
03
3*
-
-
-
-
(2
.7
67
)
(2
.7
25
)
(3
.7
05
)
(3
.7
84
)
-
-
-
-
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
61
1
61
1
30
5
30
5
61
1
61
1
30
4
30
5
R
2
or
P
se
ud
o
R
2
0.
34
0.
35
0.
23
0.
23
0.
21
0.
21
0.
17
0.
16
L
og
ps
eu
do
lik
el
ih
oo
d
-
-
-
-
-2
74
.9
5
-2
74
.4
8
-1
69
.0
8
-1
73
.4
4
**
*
p
<
0.
01
,
**
p
<
0.
05
,
*
p
<
0.
1,
ro
bu
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
(1
-4
)
O
L
S
es
ti
m
at
io
ns
,
(5
-8
)
P
ro
bi
t
es
ti
m
at
io
n
(m
ar
gi
na
l
e¤
ec
ts
re
p
or
te
d)
,
fu
rt
he
r
co
nt
ro
ls
:
ho
m
e
an
d
aw
ay
te
am
du
m
m
ie
s,
se
as
on
20
07
/2
00
8
(0
/1
),
la
st
18
ga
m
es
of
se
as
on
(0
/1
),
se
as
on
20
07
/2
00
8
in
la
st
18
ga
m
es
(0
/1
)
T
ab
le
3.
3:
G
am
e
in
te
ns
it
y
as
a
de
te
rm
in
an
t
fo
r
ga
m
e
ou
tc
om
es
81
3.5 Conclusion
Organizations often implement tournament schemes to induce incentives and
decide about promotions of their employees. Indeed, tournaments can lead
to rst best e¤ort levels but e¤ort is predicted to decline if contestants are
heterogeneous. Since in reality contests are seldom completely homogeneous,
the e¤ectiveness of tournaments in practice is called into question. As our
analysis has shown, there is strong evidence in favor of the contamination
hypothesis, i.e. heterogeneity between teams leads to a less intensive tour-
nament. We nd that especially the ex-ante favorite is likely to withhold
e¤ort while the underdog does not cease to exert e¤ort "against all odds".
In the game of handball or in team sports in general the latter result may
be attributed to social or psychological costs the inferior contestant faces
when not trying hard enough against an ex-ante dominant rival. However, in
organizations such social costs may be absent or considerably lower as e¤ort
provision is not as publicly observable as it is in sports. In organizations un-
derdogs might therefore also decide to spare costly e¤ort when the prospects
to win are considerably low.
To prevent this overall decrease in performance, rms should try to set up
tournaments between contestants of similar ability. While in sports relegation
systems or payroll caps help to ensure a competitive balance, rms can, for
instance, match contestants with equal job proles, educational background
or tenure. If this is not possible, rms may consider handicapping the more
able contestant (see for instance Lazear and Rosen (1981) or Knoeber and
Thurman (1994)), adding absolute performance standards or refraining from
using tournaments schemes at all.
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3.6 Appendix
Heterogeneity Measure Calculation Example
To give an example of this calculation, consider the game between the
TVB Lemgo and HSG Wetzlar which took place on December 12, 2007.
Table 3.4 indicates that the home team TBV Lemgo was clearly favored by
the bookmarkers. The corresponding odds imply that a bettor would receive
1.10 e for every Euro he or she placed on Lemgo. The unlikely case of a tie
would yield 13.73 e, while a win of the away team would turn every Euro
into 7.55 e. From the odds in table 3.4 it is straightforward to compute the
payout ratio which can then be used to determine the winning probabilities
of either team. The payo¤ ratio is given by the following equation:
1
1
Odd Home Team wins
+
1
Odd Tie
+
1
Odd Away Team wins
Example: 12/29/2007 Betting Odds Probability
Win of TBV Lemgo 1.10 0.816
Tie 13.73 0.065
Win of HSG Wetzlar 7.55 0.119
Het_Odds j0.816   0.119j = 0.697
Table 3.4: Calculating the winning probabilities and deriving a heterogeneity
measure from sports betting odds
In the given example the payo¤ ratio corresponds to 0.8974. Dividing this
ratio by the payo¤s connected to a win of either home or away team gives
the winning probabilities of 0.82 and 0.12 respectively.
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Figure 3.3: The distribution of 2-minute suspensions in the sample
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Dependent Variable: Sum of 2-Minute Suspensions
(1) (2) (3)
Het_Odds Het_Final Rank Het_Current Rank
2nd Quintile -0.0511 -0.0586 0.0275
(0.042) (0.039) (0.042)
3rd Quintile -0.0809* -0.1451*** -0.0668
(0.043) (0.039) (0.042)
4th Quintile -0.1585*** -0.1921*** -0.0998**
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045)
5th Quintile -0.2960*** -0.2668*** -0.1550***
(0.055) (0.052) (0.053)
Derby 0.0768* 0.0756* 0.0974**
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
Taken seats in % 0.1471 0.1044 0.0945
(0.097) (0.097) (0.100)
Spectators/1000 0.0016 0.0023 0.0085
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant 2.0319*** 2.1151*** 1.9667***
(0.122) (0.127) (0.128)
Observations 612 612 594
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 0.08
Log pseudolikelihood -1444.93 -1444.00 -1409.77
Poisson estimations, robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, Further controls: referee dummies,
home and away team dummies, season 2007/2008 (0/1), last
18 games of season (0/1), last 18 games in season 2007/2008 (0/1)
Table 3.6: The e¤ect of heterogeneity on 2-minute suspensions - di¤erent
heterogeneity measures
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Dependent Variable: Sum of 2-Minute Suspensions
1st Half 2nd Half
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Het_Odds -0.3619*** -0.2467***
(0.100) (0.088)
Het_Final Rank -0.0273*** -0.0192***
(0.006) (0.006)
Derby 0.0709 0.0544 0.0905* 0.0821
(0.062) (0.062) (0.051) (0.052)
Seats taken in % 0.0685 0.0574 0.1466 0.1396
(0.175) (0.176) (0.134) (0.135)
Spectators/1000 0.0025 0.0012 0.0069 0.0053
(0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)
Halftime Score (Di¤) -0.0075 -0.0061
(0.006) (0.006)
Constant 1.3152*** 1.4350*** 1.4275*** 1.5069***
(0.207) (0.214) (0.185) (0.191)
Observations 611 611 611 611
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06
Log pseudolikelihood -1147.77 -1145.74 -1290.33 -1288.78
Poisson estimations, robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, Further controls: referee dummies,
home and away team dummies, season 2007/2008 (0/1), last
18 games of season (0/1), last 18 games in season 2007/2008 (0/1)
Table 3.7: The e¤ect of heterogeneity on 2-minute suspensions in each half
2- Minute Suspensions
(Game Averages)
Het_Odds Sum Favorite Underdog
1st Quintile 8.73 4.18 4.55
2nd Quintile 8.93 4.42 4.52
3rd Quintile 8.11 3.84 4.28
4th Quintile 7.94 3.64 4.30
5th Quintile 7.16 2.88 4.29
All Games 8.18 3.79 4.39
Table 3.8: The relation between heterogeneity and 2-minute suspensions of
favorites and underdogs
87
Dependent Variable: 2-Minute Suspensions Favorite
Favorite is Home Team Favorite is Away Team
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Het_Odds -0.1796 -0.5322***
(0.216) (0.197)
2nd Quintile 0.0243 -0.0014
(0.075) (0.102)
3rd Quintile -0.0914 -0.1364
(0.095) (0.113)
4th Quintile -0.1085 -0.2791**
(0.116) (0.133)
5th Quintile -0.2658** -0.4082**
(0.135) (0.168)
Derby 0.2335*** 0.2295*** 0.0263 0.0123
(0.073) (0.073) (0.087) (0.092)
Seats taken in % -0.0059 0.0306 -0.1398 -0.2015
(0.168) (0.165) (0.284) (0.282)
Spectators/1000 -0.0036 -0.0080 0.0098 0.0232
(0.015) (0.015) (0.029) (0.030)
Constant 1.2866*** 1.2667*** 1.3605*** 1.2802***
(0.190) (0.188) (0.294) (0.300)
Observations 404 404 208 208
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09
Log pseudolikelihood -747.01 -745.28 -383.03 -382.49
Poisson estimations, robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, Further controls: referee dummies,
home and away team dummies, season 2007/2008 (0/1), last
18 games of season (0/1), last 18 games in season 2007/2008 (0/1)
Table 3.9: The e¤ect of heterogeneity on the favoritesnumber of 2-minute
suspensions at away games
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Chapter 4
Incentives and Cooperation in
Firms - Field Evidence1
4.1 Introduction
Economic theory has often stressed that compensation based on team per-
formance is accompanied by the danger of free-riding and consequently in-
e¢ cient employee e¤orts. This problem has been discussed comprehensively
in the theoretical and empirical literature.2 However, several arguments in
favor of team-based compensation were brought forward. A key argument
is that under team-based incentive schemes employees should be more in-
clined to support teammates fullling their tasks which in turn is benecial
for the employer. Itoh (1991) and Itoh (1992), for instance, analyze for-
mal models, showing that it can be worthwhile to base agentsrewards not
only on individual but also on coworker performance when there is scope
for mutual helping e¤orts.3 In contrast, incentive schemes purely based on
individual performance may reduce the willingness to help each other when
1This chapter is based upon Berger et al. (2011).
2See for instance Holmström (1982), Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Newhouse (1973),
or Prendergast (1999) for a survey.
3See also Holmström and Milgrom (1991), Drago and Garvey (1998) and Dur and Sol
(2010). Within a dynamic framework Auriol et al. (2002) point out that team contracts
also reduce potential negative e¤ects of career concerns by weakening incentives to reduce
colleaguesperformance.
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helping takes away time and resources from working on individual tasks (see
for instance Lazear (1989), Drago and Garvey (1998), Encinosa et al. (2007),
Burks et al. (2009)).
In this paper we investigate the connection between the structure of com-
pensation schemes and the inclination to help coworkers empirically. We
use a unique and representative employer-employee matched survey which
was conducted by the Great-Place-to-Work Institute, a company specialized
in conducting employee surveys, on behalf of the German Federal Ministry
of Labor and Social A¤airs in 2006. The data set is a sample of 305 Ger-
man rms, containing company-level information about workersand man-
agersperformance-related payment schemes. In addition, in each rm an
employee-survey has been conducted, containing detailed information about
work satisfaction of approximately 36,000 workers.
We nd that the intensity of team-based compensation schemes is sig-
nicantly positively related to several measures of cooperation. However,
neither incentives based on individual nor on rm performance a¤ect coop-
eration among employees. The positive link between team-based incentives
and cooperation is substantial: For example, a 10 percentage point increase
in the share of team-based compensation (as a percentage of total compen-
sation) is associated with an 11% increase in the number of employees who
agree to the statement that in the rm "you can count on people to cooper-
ate". This relationship depends on workforce size and is stronger in smaller
companies.
The data set also provides a direct survey question on the employees
general preference for helping others which allows us to disentangle selection
from incentive e¤ects. The e¤ect remains basically unchanged when we con-
trol for helping preferences. Moreover, while there are strong inter-industry
di¤erences in the preference for helping, we nd no di¤erences between rms
with and without team compensation schemes. Hence, we can rule out that
the results are driven by the self-selection of more cooperative employees into
organizations that use team-based incentives.
In addition, we investigate the connection between the structure of incen-
tive schemes and absenteeism. In line with the previous observations, we also
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nd evidence for less absenteeism in the presence of team incentive plans.
While there is now some consistent eld evidence showing positive e¤ects
of team incentive plans on performance (e.g. Jones and Kato (1995), Knez
and Simester (2001), Hamilton et al. (2003), Bandiera et al. (2010b) Jones
et al. (2010)), there are, to the best of our knowledge, only a very limited
number of studies focusing on the link between team incentives and helping
on the job. Drago and Garvey (1998) detect no relationship between helping
e¤orts and the existence of piece rates or prot sharing using data from a
survey of nonsupervisory employees at 23 Australian workplaces where help-
ing e¤ort is measured using responses to a survey question To what extent
do your fellow employees refuse to let others use their equipment, tools, or
machinery?. Heywood et al. (2005) analyze the relationship between prot
sharing and cooperation with the 1995 wave of the German Economic Panel
and nd a positive association between prot sharing and the perception
that employees get along well with their colleagues. While these studies only
use binary information, our data set contains information about the presence
and the strength of individual, team- and rm-based performance pay which
allows us to distinguish between the e¤ects of these three components which
typically make up incentive plans.
Our second result, that team incentives are associated with lower absen-
teeism rates, is in line with recent ndings by Knez and Simester (2001),
Bhattacherjee (2005) and Roman (2009). A possible explanation is given by
Kandel and Lazear (1992) who identify team incentives as a determinant for
peer pressure. While evidence from eld studies (Ichino and Maggi (2000),
Sacerdote (2001), Mas and Moretti (2009), Bandiera et al. (2010a)) or ex-
periments (see for instance Falk and Ichino (2006), Mohnen et al. (2008))
highlight the importance of peer e¤ects in general, eld evidence on the con-
nection between the structure of incentive schemes and peer e¤ects is still
rather scarce.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section
we present the two data sets, the matching procedure and our hypotheses.
Section 4.3 presents our main results. To meet endogeneity issues often
raised in cross-sectional research designs, this section also includes several
91
subsample analyses and control specications. In section 4.3.3 we present
our ndings concerning absenteeism and team incentives, before concluding
in section 4.4.
4.2 Data and Hypotheses
Our data source is a 2006 employer-employee matched survey conducted by
the Great-Place-to-Work Institute and the German Federal Ministry of Labor
and Social A¤airs. The data set is a representative sample of 305 German
rms employing a minimum of 20 workers. In each rm, the management
provided company-level information on organizational facts, corporate values
as well as on various HR practices such as trainings, benets and compen-
sation. Most of this information is provided separately for managers and
workers in each rm.4
In addition to this rm-level information, a representative employee-
survey was conducted at each sampled rm, yielding over 36,000 observations
in total. Among others, the employee survey includes 58 standardized items
to be answered on a 5-point Likert scale which are designed to measure the
level of trust, pride, and cooperation within rms. More precisely, the items
focus on the relationship between employees and management, the work en-
vironment, and the relationship between employees. In our analysis we focus
on the last aspect, i.e. the perceived level of cooperation among colleagues.
Due to the random sampling process, the 305 rms are almost evenly
spread across the di¤erent industries in Germany. The majority of the sam-
pled rms are small or medium sized. While the average number of employees
amounts to 430, the median is at 157. However, roughly 10% of the rms
employ more than 1,000 workers including the largest rm in the sample with
14,000 workers.
Previous studies (e.g. Drago and Garvey (1998), Heywood et al. (2005))
mainly relied on binary information about whether workers participate in
rm prots. Our data set allows a more in depths analysis on how much
4More specically, answers were provided for employees in supervisory function and for
the largest group of non-managerial employees, i.e. the core occupational group.
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employees benet from economic outcomes and which pay components drive
the e¤ects. Each rm stated whether wages for managers and workers in the
corresponding rm include a performance-related pay component. For both,
managers and workers, we know the share of the average wage (in %) which
is determined by performance-related pay (henceforth PRP). Furthermore,
rms reported how much (in %) of total PRP is determined by either indi-
vidual, team, or rm performance. Multiplying these numbers, we derive the
fractions (in %) of the total wage that are based on the three di¤erent types
of PRP.
Figure 4.1 gives a descriptive overview of PRP usage across industries,
showing the share of rms using PRP. While the majority of sampled rms
use variable pay components for managers, the use of worker PRP varies
from only 6% of all organizations in the Public Sector to 71% in Financial
Services. In total 109 out of 2945 rms use PRP for their core occupational
group. Figure 4.2 shows the composition of workersincentives across indus-
tries. Though rm- and team-based variable compensation is quite common,
individual incentive schemes have the prominent role. Roughly 55% of vari-
able wage components are based on individual performance. Table 4.1 reports
the average strength of incentives for the subset of rms who use at least one
type of worker PRP. The mean magnitude of workers incentive pay amounts
to roughly 12% of the xed wage. While workers incentive pay is mainly
based on individual performance, the largest fraction of managersincentives
is determined by the economic success of the company as a whole. For both
groups, team incentives are relatively low. In rms using worker PRP, team
incentives only account for 18% of total incentives and thus for only 2.2% of
the total average wage.
Complementing the rm level information provided by management, we
exploit the employee surveys conducted in each rm to measure the degree of
cooperation among the workforce.6 Table 4.2 shows 4 items of the employee
survey which reect workersperception of teamwork and team atmosphere
511 out of the 305 sampled rms did not provide information on PRP.
6In rms with less than 500 employees all employees were asked to participate. In
larger rms a representative 500-employee sample was drawn.
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Figure 4.1: Utilization of performance-related pay across German industries
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Figure 4.2: Structure of performance-related pay across German industries
Variable Description Workers Managers
Individual PRP % of Individual PRP on Average Wages 7.5% 4.8%
Team PRP % of Team PRP on Average Wages 2.2% 4.4%
Firm PRP % of Firm PRP on Average Wages 2.6% 8.4%
Total PRP Total Percentage of PRP on Average Wages 12.4% 17.6%
Table 4.1: Utilization of performance-related pay in the sample
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within a rm. All items use the same 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1
almost always untrueto 5 almost always trueand refer to the company
as a whole. The table displays simple descriptive statistics of responses given
by full-time workers in all sampled rms.7 The top-box column shows the
percentage of workers who a¢ rm a statement by choosing 4 or 5 on the 5-
point scale. Overall, 54.6% of the responders a¢ rm the statement You can
count on people to cooperate. The share of workers in a rm agreeing to an
item serves as a dependent variable and is coded between 0 and 100.
Variable Description Top-Box Sd
(1) Cooperate "You can count on people to cooperate" 54.6% 17.6
(2) Care "People care about each other" 52.5% 18.1
(3) Team Spirit "There is a familyor teamfeeling here" 45.9% 19.2
(4) Backstab "People avoid politicking and backstabbing" 47.6% 18.1
Table 4.2: Survey items approximating cooperation
Detailed rm level information on PRP and suitable measures for team
work in the rm allow for testing the relationship between incentives and
the level of cooperation. We expect cooperation in rms to be positively
a¤ected by team incentives. The relation between individual incentives and
cooperation is less clear cut. If supplying helping e¤ort raises the costs for
supplying privatee¤ort, individual incentives reduce the inclination to help
coworkers. If costs for helping e¤ort are, however, independent of the costs of
privatee¤ort supply, individual incentives do not a¤ect helping on the job
(see Itoh (1991)). Incentives based on rm performance only gradually di¤er
from team incentives, since a rm can been seen as a large team. However,
the marginal e¤ect on rm performance should be much smaller than the
e¤ect on team performance measures. Second, peer pressure is less likely to
be sustainable as mutual monitoring becomes impracticable in larger teams.
Hence, we expect to nd a weaker relationship between rm level incentives
and cooperation.
7Full-time employees with non-supervisory function are most likely to correspond to
"the largest share of employees in the rm" addressed in the management survey questions.
In the analysis of worker pay schemes on cooperation we therefore restrict our analysis to
the answers given by this group.
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Several other rm specic characteristics might also contribute to the
level of perceived cooperation. As laid out above, the level of cooperation
within a rm should be inuenced by the number of workers constituting a
team unit. We use the number of hierarchical levels to control for potential
di¤erences in team unit size across rms. For a given workforce size, more
hierarchical levels should positively a¤ect cooperation among workers due to
a smaller average team size. In contrast, more hierarchical levels might also
entail stronger promotion based incentives which in turn generate incentives
to refrain from helping or even to sabotage colleagues (see Lazear (1989) and
Drago and Garvey (1998)).
Moreover, the e¤ect of team performance pay on cooperation might be
mitigated by workforce size. Large rms tend to o¤er a greater variety of
workplaces and development possibilities. Employees can avoid peer pres-
sure by changing team, division, or location. Workers in small rms have
fewer within-rm exit options and are exposed to potential peer pressure to
a higher degree. Therefore, team-based compensation in small rms may
lead to higher degrees of cooperation. In small rms employees are also more
likely to interact in the future because the number of potential coworkers is
limited. Hence, behavioral responses to team incentives do not only a¤ect
present but also future interaction with colleagues and should therefore fos-
ter cooperation. Che and Yoo (2001), for instance, show that under team
incentives a higher frequency of future interactions increases productivity in
a repeated game.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Team Incentives and Cooperation
To study the relationship between incentives and the level of cooperation we
match the rm-level information obtained in the management survey to the
percentage of workersa¢ rmative answers to the survey items on coopera-
tion. We then estimate the relation between incentive scheme structure and
the percentage of workers agreeing to these cooperation items with OLS re-
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gressions.8 We control for rm characteristics such as rm size, industry and
the presence of a works council. As noted above, we include the number of
hierarchical levels to approximate team unit size when rm size is controlled
for.
Table 4.3 presents our main results.9 Team PRP is indeed signicantly
and positively related to all cooperation items. In economic terms, a 10%
point higher team PRP is associated with a 6 percentage point increase in
the fraction of a¢ rmative answers to the item "You can count on people to
cooperate". The predicted fraction of employees agreeing to that statement
at the mean of all other explanatory variables is equal to 54.3% when there is
no team PRP. This fraction increases by about 11% to 60.3% of all employees
when team PRP is 10% instead. The e¤ect is of similar magnitude for all
four items.
However, we do not nd any relationship between our measures of coop-
eration and the strength of rm incentives. Also, higher individual incentives
do not seem to be harmful for the perceived degree of cooperation. This indi-
cates that there are no or rather low substitution e¤ects between individual
and helping e¤orts.10 Furthermore, it is interesting to note that employees
state a higher rate of cooperation if their rm organizes work in smaller team
units as suggested by the positive coe¢ cient of Hierarchical Levels at a given
rm size.
According to our hypothesis, we should expect a stronger impact of team
incentives in smaller rms. Table 4.4 captures the interaction between in-
centive pay and rm size. Note that for 3 of 4 items, the e¤ect of team
compensation negatively interacts with workforce size. The relation between
team incentives and cooperation is thus particularly strong in small rms
and tends to diminish with workforce size. In our linear interaction the re-
lationship between team incentives and cooperation vanishes at a workforce
8Note that that there are nearly no observations of the dependent variables at the
boundary of the [0; 100] interval. Hence, tobit regressions lead to nearly identical results.
9Table 4.9 gives descriptive statistics of all explanatory variables.
10In the notation of Itohs (1991) model, the employees seem to rather have task
specicdisutility of e¤ort such that their individual cost functions are rather additively
separable in costs for individual e¤orts and costs for helping e¤orts with vanishing cross
derivatives.
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All Firms
Dependent Variable: Cooperate Care Team Spirit Backstab
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual PRP 0.023 0.050 0.147 0.172
(0.134) (0.118) (0.153) (0.135)
Team PRP 0.599*** 0.487*** 0.620*** 0.575***
(0.227) (0.182) (0.167) (0.195)
Firm PRP 0.056 0.170 0.380 -0.126
(0.344) (0.420) (0.527) (0.572)
Hierarchical Levels 3.268*** 3.529*** 1.790** 1.824*
(0.827) (0.962) (0.877) (1.089)
Works Council -4.734** -4.524* -5.007* -9.103***
(2.329) (2.561) (2.808) (2.459)
Constant 55.355*** 51.677*** 48.863*** 53.493***
(5.531) (6.024) (5.752) (6.193)
Observations 281 281 281 281
R2 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.18
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses
OLS regression: further controls: 2 rm size dummies and 11 industry dummies
Reference category: 0-99 employee rm in the food industry
Table 4.3: Performance-related pay and cooperation among workers
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size of approximately 400.
All Firms
Dependent Variable: Cooperate Care Team Spirit Backstab
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual PRP 0.032 0.058 0.106 0.211
(0.177) (0.153) (0.200) (0.181)
Team PRP 0.679** 0.667*** 0.787*** 0.774***
(0.289) (0.220) (0.205) (0.206)
Firm PRP 0.216 0.273 0.354 -0.218
(0.458) (0.553) (0.686) (0.757)
Workers/100 0.001 0.002* 0.001 0.004***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Individual PRP  Workers/100 0.018 0.023 0.022 0.001
(0.021) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022)
Team PRP  Workers/100 -0.068 -0.176** -0.190** -0.196**
(0.105) (0.081) (0.095) (0.083)
Firm PRP  Workers/100 -0.041 -0.010 0.015 0.072
(0.066) (0.065) (0.076) (0.085)
Hierarchical Levels 3.243*** 3.475*** 1.739* 1.759
(0.835) (0.956) (0.885) (1.110)
Works Council -4.894** -4.780* -5.139* -9.403***
(2.364) (2.593) (2.842) (2.492)
Constant 55.462*** 52.033*** 49.297*** 53.969***
(5.619) (6.090) (5.826) (6.304)
Observations 281 281 281 281
R2 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.19
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses
OLS regression: further controls: 11 industry dummies
Reference category: 0-99 employee rm in the food industry
Table 4.4: Performance-related pay, cooperation among workers and rmsize
In a further robustness check, we consider two more homogenous sub-
samples of rms. First, we restrict the analysis to rms which use at least
one form of performance-based pay. In the next step, we consider only rms
which use team incentives for their employees. The left panel of table 4.5
shows results for rms which use at least one type of PRP. We again nd
a positive and signicant relationship between team incentives and coopera-
tion, comparable in magnitude and statistical signicance with the proceed-
99
ing analysis. The right panel displays a similar picture for the subsample
of rms using team PRP. Even in this drastically reduced sample, our main
result remains robust across all four items.11
11Due to the reduced sample of 40 rms, we do not include industry dummies in these
specications. In the preceeding analysis industries showed little statistically signicance.
Including industry dummies here yields a 20 regressor-40 observation regression with no
signicant estimates.
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As the management survey contains detailed information on other man-
agement practices, we are able to control for further rm characteristics that
are potentially confounding factors: The fraction of part-time employees,
for instance, may a¤ect the intensity of daily interaction of the workforce.
Information about the wage level captures the companys wage policy and
the attractiveness of a workplace. Whether a rm is currently downsizing or
upsizing may have e¤ects on the level of cooperation and may also a¤ect the
structure of compensation. Trainings could foster social interaction among
the workforce and thereby a¤ect cooperation. The presence of systematic
female career support reects the companys antidiscriminatory e¤orts and
attempts to create a fair working environment. Furthermore, the general
working climate, captured by the share of workers who are satised with
their current job, may not only inuence cooperative behavior but could also
be inuenced by the companys wage scheme. Table 4.10 shows estimates for
column 1 of our basic specication from table 4.3 and the additional controls
discussed above.12 The e¤ect of team PRP remains statistically and econom-
ically stable over all specications, indicating a robust relationship between
team PRP and cooperation among the workforce.13
4.3.2 Incentives or Self-Selection?
It is important to understand the key mechanism by which team incentives
a¤ect cooperation in more detail. Indeed, a given set of employees should
have stronger incentives to cooperate if team performance is rewarded. But
in addition, self-selection could also play a role as workers with preferences for
cooperation may self-select into rms with team incentives. Then cooperation
should increase simply due to the di¤erent composition of the workforce.
Lazear (2000), for instance, showed in his seminal study on the e¤ect of
piece rates on productivity that about half of the productivity e¤ect was
due to self-selection. Moreover, recent laboratory studies (e.g. Cadsby et al.
(2007), Dohmen and Falk (2011), Eriksson and Villeval (2008)) suggest that
12Regressions for all other items show almost identical patterns.
13The substantially reduced number of observations in the last column results from
missing values in rmstraining or gender career programs.
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payment scheme design causes sorting e¤ects, not only with respect to agents
abilities but also to their social preferences.
To investigate the self-selection argument in our data, we explore another
subsection of the employee survey in which employees were asked which as-
pects of a job are important to them in general. Besides job security, high
income or promotion opportunities, workers were also asked: How impor-
tant is it for you to have a profession in which you can help others?which
should capture an individuals general willingness to help others. If self-
selection with respect to the specic structure of performance pay plays a
role, we should expect the fraction of workers with a preference for helping
to be higher in rms that tie rewards to team or rm performance. Including
the fraction of workers with a preference for helping as an additional control
in our baseline specication should then also reduce the coe¢ cient of team
PRP.
In the models reported in table 4.6, we rst regress the share of workers
in a rm stating that a job in which one can help others is important or
very important to them on the structure of incentive pay and our set of
standard rm controls. We again run the regressions for the entire sample
but also for the Using-PRP and Using-Team-PRP subsamples. In none of
the specications neither individual, team nor rm PRP signicantly explain
the share of employees to whom helping is important.14
We also include this measure of the employees general preference for
helping in our basic OLS estimation to control for the share of cooperative
workers in the rm. The results are displayed in table 4.7 and show that the
coe¢ cients of our variables of interest remain almost unchanged. Hence, we
conclude that self-selection seems to be no key driver for the positive relation
between team incentive schemes and cooperation in our data.
Interestingly, the distribution of cooperative preferences is quite heteroge-
neous across industries, as displayed in gure 4.3 where we graph the coe¢ -
cients of the industry dummies included in table 4.6. Maybe not surprisingly,
the share of cooperative workers is largest in health and social assistance and
14Note that we do nd, for instance, that the share of workers stating that a high income
is important to them increases in the strength of individual incentives.
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Dependent Variable: Preference for Helping
All Firms Using PRP Using Team PRP
(1) (2) (3)
Individual PRP 0.0218 -0.0524 0.261
(0.114) (0.149) (0.407)
Team PRP -0.324 -0.184 -0.483
(0.284) (0.280) (0.304)
Firm PRP -0.177 -0.111 -0.546
(0.327) (0.450) (0.955)
Hierarchical Levels 0.0146 -0.813 -2.756
(0.519) (1.015) (5.109)
Works Council -4.692*** -7.636** -18.31**
(1.698) (3.706) (6.991)
Constant 88.28*** 82.15*** 93.70***
(2.549) (4.849) (11.97)
Observations 281 101 40
R2 0.34 0.35 0.63
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses
OLS regression: further controls: 2 rm size dummies
and 11 industry dummies
Reference category: 0-99 employee rm in the food industry
Table 4.6: Performance-related pay and self-selection
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All Firms
Dependent Variable: Cooperate Care Team Spirit Backstab
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual PRP 0.022 0.052 0.146 0.174
(0.138) (0.115) (0.154) (0.133)
Team PRP 0.622*** 0.464** 0.631*** 0.555***
(0.222) (0.188) (0.172) (0.198)
Firm PRP 0.069 0.157 0.386 -0.137
(0.336) (0.432) (0.521) (0.579)
Hierarchical Levels 3.267*** 3.530*** 1.790** 1.825*
(0.823) (0.959) (0.878) (1.096)
Works Council -4.408* -4.853* -4.853* -9.394***
(2.331) (2.593) (2.818) (2.442)
Preference for Helping 0.069 -0.070 0.033 -0.062
(0.111) (0.092) (0.109) (0.101)
Constant 49.226*** 57.860*** 45.955*** 58.971***
(10.057) (9.088) (10.157) (9.928)
Observations 281 281 281 281
R2 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.18
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses
OLS regression: further controls: 2 rm size dummies and 11 industry dummies
Reference category: 0-99 employee rm in the food industry
Table 4.7: Performance-related pay, self selection and cooperation among
workers
105
lowest in nancial and business-related services. Since our helping preference
measure delivers plausible results for workers sorting into di¤erent industries,
we are condent about our conclusion that incentive schemes do not lead to
self-selection according to these preferences.
4.3.3 Team Incentives and Absenteeism
Having investigated the relationship between team incentives and perceived
cooperation, we further test whether this positive relation is also reected in
more objective performance measures. A key gure that most management
representatives (259 out of 305) were able to provide is the workersaverage
number of missed work days. In our sample, a worker missed on average 9
days of work.
Absenteeism is likely to decrease with rising individual incentives. More-
over, absenteeism is also predicted to decrease with higher team incentives.
Recent studies have indicated that team incentives and increased peer pres-
sure can e¤ectively prevent workers from staying at home (Knez and Simester
(2001), Bhattacherjee (2005) and Roman (2009)). Alternatively, if team in-
centives strengthen team spirit and cooperation, as suggested by our study,
this mechanism might additionally reduce absenteeism. In a sense, a well
functioning team may prevent workers from letting their colleagues down. To
further test the economic importance of team incentives, we regress yearly
absenteeism days on the incentive structure observed in each rm.
Table 4.8 shows that higher team incentives are indeed linked to fewer
absent days. In our rst specication, a 10% point increase in team PRP is
associated with 1.4 fewer absent days per worker and year. Controlling for job
satisfaction and average workforce age in specication 2, a 10% point higher
team PRP comes along with one absence day less. Interestingly, individual
PRP is far from statistical signicance in both specications. On the right
side of table 4.8, we again restrict the analysis to rms who use PRP for
their workers. Even in this substantially smaller sample, the main result
that higher team incentives are associated with less absenteeism remains
signicant.
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Dependent Variable: Average Absent Days
All Firms Firms Using PRP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual PRP 0.023 0.029 -0.044 -0.046
(0.044) (0.045) (0.067) (0.068)
Team PRP -0.132** -0.097* -0.228** -0.201*
(0.059) (0.059) (0.107) (0.113)
Firm PRP 0.010 -0.017 -0.174 -0.197
(0.097) (0.099) (0.165) (0.176)
Works Council 2.738*** 2.117*** 2.716* 2.325
(0.746) (0.726) (1.386) (1.513)
Job Satisfaction -6.402* 0.552
(3.330) (5.987)
Workforce Age 0.217*** 0.134
(0.079) (0.162)
Constant 6.488*** 3.350 8.690*** 2.892
(0.737) (4.080) (1.420) (8.341)
Observations 248 248 92 92
R2 0.26 0.30 0.35 0.35
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses
OLS regression: Further controls: 2 rm size dummies and
11 industry dummies
Reference category: 0-99 employee rm in the food industry
Table 4.8: Performance-related pay and absenteeism
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4.4 Conclusion
The aim of this study was to identify the relationship between incentive
schemes and the level of cooperation among workers. We could make use of
a large representative employer-employee survey, spanning a representative
sample of rms from all industries which contains much more detailed infor-
mation on the structure of incentive schemes as compared to data sets that
have previously been used. Investigating this data set, we detected a positive
relationship between the intensity of average team incentives in a rm and
perceived helping e¤orts. We did not nd similar e¤ects for variable compen-
sation based on company performance. This observation is well in line with
what we expect from a standard agency model: Apparently, performance pay
based on overall rm success is not su¢ cient to induce higher helping e¤orts
as there is a large free rider problem which is much weaker when the per-
formance of specic teams is measured. Moreover, our results indicate that
higher individual performance pay has no negative consequences for help-
ing e¤orts and that the positive e¤ects of team incentives are not driven by
self-selection. In line with these ndings, we also found less absenteeism in
rms providing stronger team incentives but not in rms using higher levels
of individual performance pay.
All in all, our results strongly support the idea that team incentive
schemes are a key component in a rms incentive strategy and substantially
a¤ect the level of cooperation in organizations.
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***
*
***
***
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
Regression Coefficients
Item - Importance of Helping
Health and Social Assistance
Food Industry
Trade, Maintenance and Repair
Construction
Logistics and Transportation
Automotive Industry
Metal Industry
Chemical Industry
Mechanical Engineering
Financial Services
Business-related Services
Public Administration serves as reference category
*** p < 0.01; * p < 0.1
Figure 4.3: The fraction of cooperative employees across German industries
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All Firms
Dependent Variable: "You can count on the people to cooperate"
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Individual PRP 0.0545 0.0153 0.0164 -0.0107 -0.261**
(0.138) (0.156) (0.145) (0.121) (0.116)
Team PRP 0.626*** 0.672*** 0.652*** 0.557*** 0.665***
(0.231) (0.222) (0.176) (0.195) (0.181)
Firm PRP 0.112 0.0697 -0.134 -0.131 -0.143
(0.353) (0.362) (0.330) (0.308) (0.445)
Hierarchical Levels 3.346*** 3.719*** 3.787*** 3.051*** 2.505**
(0.793) (0.788) (0.751) (0.667) (1.076)
Works Council -3.931* -4.606** -3.186 -2.047 0.0705
(2.311) (2.305) (2.370) (2.197) (2.987)
Part-time Workers 0.169** 0.127* 0.132* 0.0917 0.115
(0.0773) (0.0747) (0.0718) (0.0618) (0.0894)
Wages below Tari¤ -4.176 -4.975 -2.598 -8.164
(3.985) (3.842) (3.012) (7.400)
Wages above Tari¤ -0.0531 -0.0325 0.229 2.178
(2.144) (2.087) (1.839) (2.855)
Workforce Reduction -1.871 -0.665 -3.258
(2.325) (2.193) (3.607)
Workforce Increase 6.832*** 5.481** 7.546**
(2.443) (2.271) (3.326)
Job Satisfaction 0.478*** 0.408**
(0.110) (0.179)
Gender Career -5.246
(8.842)
Trainings -0.011
(0.028)
Constant 51.02*** 51.03*** 47.07*** 12.92 11.37
(5.274) (5.257) (5.656) (9.220) (15.39)
Observations 281 257 257 257 145
R2 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.40 0.40
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses
OLS regression: further controls: 11 industry and 2 rm size dummies
Reference category: 0-99 employee rm in the food industry
Table 4.10: Performance-related pay, HR policies and cooperation among
workers
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Chapter 5
Gender Di¤erences in Risk
Preferences among Workers
and Managers - Field Evidence
from Germany1
5.1 Introduction
Risk attitudes crucially a¤ect behavior in various domains of life. The degree
of risk aversion determines, for instance, entrepreneurship (Caliendo et al.
(2011)), industry choice, portfolio choice (Dohmen et al. (2011)) and self-
selection into payment schemes (Dohmen and Falk (2011)). Understanding
the antecedents of individual risk aversion is therefore often necessary for
understanding and predicting individual decision making.
Previous studies have frequently looked at gender as a central determi-
nant of risk aversion. Based on behavioral risk measures involving real-
stake lotteries or investment choices, recent experimental studies provide
rather consistent evidence that women are less willing to take risks than men
(see for instance Holt and Laury (2002), Eckel and Grossman (2002), Eckel
and Grossman (2008a) or Croson and Gneezy (2009), Eckel and Grossman
1This chapter is based upon Berger (2011).
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(2008b) and Charness and Gneezy (2010) for recent surveys). However, most
of these experiments study gender e¤ects among students or the "general
population". Studies involving professionals and managers are less clear cut.
Indeed, several studies nd no systematic di¤erence in investment behavior
among professional male and female fund managers (e.g. Atkinson et al.
(2003)) or among students who have undertaken formal management train-
ing (e.g. Johnson and Powell (1994)). In chapter 2.4 of their survey article
Croson and Gneezy (2009) summarize the evidence on gender-specic risk
di¤erences among managers and professionals as follows: "The conclusion is
that gender di¤erences in risk preferences among the general population do
not extend to managers. This could be the result of selection; people that are
more risk taking tend to choose managerial positions. While fewer women
select these positions, those that do choose them have similar risk preferences
as men. This result could also be an adaptive behavior to the requirements of
the job." (p. 6-7)
In this paper I test this "important exception to the rule" with two rep-
resentative, yet independent surveys, the 2009 wave of the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) and a unique representative employer-employee
matched survey data set containing 305 rms and more than 36,000 individ-
ual employee responses of the year 2006 (GPTW), the data set which has
already been introduced in chapter 4. Both surveys not only contain items
that assess individual risk preferences but also distinguish between employees
working in non-managerial and di¤erent managerial positions. The benet
of analyzing the GPTW data set in addition to the GSOEP is that it allows
me to control for selection and unobserved rm-xed e¤ects. Furthermore,
the data set provides richer rm information, which I use to study additional
determinants of risk aversion such as a companys incentive system.
The main result of the paper is that women are, at all hierarchical posi-
tions, signicantly more risk averse than men. Furthermore, the gender risk
gap is neither systematically lower nor systematically higher among managers
than among workers. In line with the literature, managers are on average less
risk averse than employees in non-management positions and top managers
are less risk averse than managers in the lower or middle management. The
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results are fairly similar across both data sets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I rst test my research
question with the GSOEP which I briey explain and then analyze in the
next chapter. Chapter 5.3 takes similar steps and tests my main research
question using the GPTW data set. An additional chapter focuses on the
interplay of gender, risk preferences and performance-related pay in some
more detail, before a conclusion is presented in chapter 5.5.
5.2 GSOEP: Data, Methods and Results
The GSOEP is a longitudinal and representative survey containing detailed
information of over 20,000 individuals in roughly 12,000 households in Ger-
many. Individuals give information on socio-demographics, job and work
related attributes and make subjective assessments of individual preferences,
including risk, personality, satisfaction and the like.2
Key to my analysis are the subjective assessments of the individualsgen-
eral willingness to take risk. In particular, individuals are asked: "How do
you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take
risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?" The question is to be answered on
a 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 "unwilling to take risks" to 10 "fully
prepared to take risks".3 This validated survey measure is a reliable predictor
of actual risk taking behavior (Dohmen et al. (2011), Hardeweg et al. (2011)
and Ding et al. (2010)). The measure also exhibits test-re-test stability (Lön-
nqvist et al. (2011)) and even seems to dominate the popular real-stake risk
elicitation method introduced by Holt and Laury (2002) (Hardeweg et al.
(2011) and Lönnqvist et al. (2011)). In addition, two more context-specic
but similarily worded risk measures concerning the willingness to take risks
in ones occupation and in nancial matters are investigated.4
2A detailed description of the data set can be found in Burkhauser and Wagner (1993)
and Schupp and Wagner (2002)
3Translated from German.
4Dohmen et al. (2011) report that the general risk question turns out to be the best
risk measure across di¤erent domains of risk taking while the more context-specic risk
measures, also included in the GSOEP, have a higher predictive power for the particular
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The 2009 wave contains a new variable, characterizing the individuals
hierarchical position at work.5 To be precise, every person was asked if he
or she is in a leadership position, and if so, whether he or she is in a highly
qualied specialist position (e.g. project head), in the lower management (e.g.
group supervisor, section head), in the middle management (e.g. department
head, regional director) or in the top management (e.g. executive board,
business director, division manager). This information allows me to analyze
gender di¤erences in risk attitudes at the non-managerial level and at four
di¤erent managerial levels.6
Figure 5.1 displays the distribution of the general willingness to take
risks in the sample.7 Survey answers are nicely distributed with the modal
response being the mid point of the scale and roughly half of the distributional
mass below it.
To provide a graphical illustration of my main research question, I classify
an individual as "risk averse" if he or she ticked 5 or below on the 11-point
scale. Arguably, the classication is arbitrary as I do not know if these indi-
viduals are in fact risk averse in the strict sense. However, this classication
yields a proportion of risk averse individuals similar to previous estimations
derived from real-stake lotteries.8
Figure 5.2 displays, separately for women and men, the proportion of "risk
risk context.
5This variable was previously only included in the 2007 wave of the GSOEP. However,
in that year the risk questions were not included. I therefore restrict my analysis to the
year of 2009 in which both key variables are available. For robustness checks, I took the
risk attitudes from 2006 for the 2007 wave and re-ran all my analyses with pooled cross
sections and random e¤ects regressions for the years 2007 and 2009. The main results
remain qualitatively very similar. Results are available on request.
6Fietze et al. (2010) also use this variable to study personality di¤erences between
female and male leaders in the 2007 wave of the GSOEP. They only briey look at gender
di¤erences in risk attitudes and seem to nd similar results as I do. However, they only
use binary information to distinguish leaders from non-leaders and only look at sample
means.
7I restrict the GSOEP sample to full or part-time employees. However, the results are
not sensitive to this restriction.
8According to my classication roughly 76% of the sample is risk averse. In the seminal
work of Holt and Laury (2002) 81% of subjects are risk averse. Using real-stake lotter-
ies, Dohmen et al. (2011) estimate that 78% of the GSEOP sample is risk averse. In a
supplementary analysis, Dohmen et al. (2011) use the same cut-o¤ point to run binary
regressions to explain risk aversion.
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of the general willingness to take risks in the GSOEP
2009
averse" employees at all hierarchical levels and the 95% condence intervals
of the respective estimates.
First, the gure clearly shows that, on average, the share of risk averse
women is substantially higher than the share of risk averse men on any given
level. On each position, the share of women ticking one of the lower scale
points is at least 10% points higher and this di¤erence does not systematically
vary in the hierarchical level.9 Second, it seems that the general level of risk
aversion decreases in the hierarchical level, i.e. managers are less risk averse
than non-managerial workers. The share of risk averse women decreases
from 84% in the non-managerial domain to 65% in the top management.
For men, the respective numbers are 73% and 55%. Given the decrease in
the absolute level of risk aversion among managers, the gender-specic risk
di¤erence even increases in relative terms when moving up the hierarchy. The
displayed condence intervals also suggest that the di¤erences are signicant.
Of course, the graphical representation of the main result may be incon-
9It seems that the di¤erence get slightly larger for middle managers and slightly smaller
for top managers.
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Figure 5.2: Gender-specic risk di¤erences across hierarchical levels in the
GSOEP - descriptives
clusive. The general level of risk aversion could, for instance, systematically
di¤er across industries. As some industries are known to be male-dominated
while others are more female-dominated, the observed di¤erences may be
driven by industry rather than gender e¤ects. Other individual character-
istics such as age, employment status or income may also be confounding
factors which should be taken into account.10 Similar to previous studies
(e.g. Bell (2005)), female managers in the GSOEP are signicantly younger
and earn less money than their male counterparts. Given that risk aversion
is expected to increase with age (e.g. Dohmen et al. (2011)), the risk gap
among managers may turn out to be even larger than suggested by gure
5.2, once age is controlled for. In contrast, a higher income may allow indi-
viduals to become more risk seeking.11 The persisting risk di¤erences may
10Note that gender is, however, a perfectly exogeneous variable and thus less likely to
be confounded by unobserved characteristics.
11Note that causality may also run the opposite way. Risk seeking behavior not only
bears the risk of loosing more but also the chance of winning more. Since we do not
observe individuals that were very unsuccessful, e.g. became unemployed or died, chances
are that risky behavior determines higher incomes in the sample.
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thus simply be attributed to the gender wage gap.
In order to isolate the average gender-specic risk di¤erence across lev-
els more precisely, I use a multiple regression approach that allows me to
additionally control for age, education, income, marital status, origin, em-
ployment status, job category, rm size and industry. Descriptive statistics
of these variables are provided in table 5.7. Due to the ordinal structure of
the dependent variable, I run ordered probit regressions. I rst regress the
willingness to take risks on a female dummy and a set of control variables
for all ve job positions separately. The results are presented in table 5.1.
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The results obtained from the regression analysis parallel the visual im-
pression derived in gure 5.2. Even after controlling for various individual
and rm characteristics women are, irrespective of the hierarchical level, sig-
nicantly more risk averse than men. The female coe¢ cients on the rst
three management levels are highly signicant and at least the size of female
coe¢ cient of non-managerial employees. Computing the marginal e¤ects of
the estimates reveals that, for instance, women in the middle management
are 3.3% more likely than men to consider themselves as "unwilling to take
risks" (i.e. they tick 0 on the scale from 0-10). This di¤erence is substantial
given that only 3.7% of all middle managers give this response. In compar-
ison, non-managerial women are 3.5% more likely to tick 0 than their male
counterparts, while the sample average for this value is roughly 7% among
all non-managerials. The female coe¢ cient regarding the top management
positions is only marginally signicant and somewhat smaller than in the
rst column. Similar to previous ndings, risk aversion decreases with age
and is higher for employees with higher incomes.12
To test if the estimated female dummies di¤er signicantly across levels,
I interact gender and job level. The regression also includes four hierarchy
dummies (with non-managerial workers being the reference category) to test
if risk aversion decreases on higher levels. I run the regression on the general
risk item and two context-specic risk measures, the willingness to take risk
in once occupation and the willingness to take risk in nancial matters. Table
5.2 shows the results for the variables of interest.
The highly signicant female dummy resembles the gender-specic risk
di¤erence among non-managerial employees also obtained in column 1 of ta-
ble 5.1. As predicted, the willingness to take risk increases in the hierarchical
position (among males), indicated by the economically and statistically in-
creasing coe¢ cients fromHighly Qualied to Top Mgmt.13 Compared to male
non-managerials, male employees in the lower management are 0.7%, male
employees in the middle management are 2.6% and male top managers are
12As Dohmen et al. (2011) argue, age and income and other control variables included
in the regression may be endogeneous to individual risk preferences. Including or dropping
them from the analysis does not a¤ect the gender estimate by much.
13The di¤erences between the di¤erent levels are also signicant.
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Dependent Variable: "Willingness to take risks"
(0=unwilling to take risks; 10=fully prepared to take risks)
General Risk Job Risk Financial Risk
(1) (2) (3)
1 if Female -0.289*** -0.234*** -0.314***
(0.0316) (0.0320) (0.0330)
1 if Highly Qualied 0.112** 0.127** 0.0684
(0.0527) (0.0533) (0.0539)
1 if Lower Mgmt 0.0713* 0.178*** 0.0928**
(0.0432) (0.0436) (0.0442)
1 if Middle Mgmt 0.305*** 0.418*** 0.147***
(0.0519) (0.0523) (0.0530)
1 if Top Mgmt 0.469*** 0.527*** 0.251***
(0.0639) (0.0643) (0.0649)
Female  Highly Qualied -0.0246 0.0319 -0.0847
(0.0913) (0.0926) (0.0952)
Female  Lower Mgmt 0.0507 0.0427 -0.0812
(0.0670) (0.0676) (0.0698)
Female  Middle Mgmt -0.155* -0.127 -0.0646
(0.0910) (0.0918) (0.0938)
Female  Top Mgmt -0.0426 -0.0420 -0.0738
(0.110) (0.111) (0.113)
Observations 9,010 8,964 8,987
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.03 0.03
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, standard errors in parentheses
Ordered probit regression: Firm controls: industry dummies (11), rm size dummies (3)
Individual controls: age, years of education, log income, marital status dummies (3),
1 if German, 1 if full-time employee, 1 if east Germany, job category dummies (4)
Table 5.2: Gender-specic risk di¤erences across hierarchical levels in the
GSOEP - interacted regressions
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3.5% less likely to consider themselves as unwilling to takes risks. Second, the
interaction between the female dummy and the hierarchical levels do neither
yield sizeable nor signicant di¤erences conrming the absence of a decrease
in gender-specic risk di¤erences on managerial positions. Third, the re-
sults for the general risk question extend to the other two context-specic
risk questions regarding nancial matters and occupation, two risk domains
which are of particular importance for managerial decision making.14
5.3 GPTW: Data, Methods and Results
Even though the GSOEP is a representative sample of the German pop-
ulation and includes both a validated measure of risk attitudes as well as
detailed information on the employees managerial position, the observed gen-
der di¤erence among managers may result from a lack of proper controls. In
particular, the risk di¤erence may be driven by unobserved rm-specic char-
acteristics forcing managers to be more or less risk averse at given managerial
levels. If female managers worked in companies that generally induce lower
levels of risk taking, treatment (female) and control group (males) would
systematically di¤er with respect to company-specic e¤ects. Since I do not
observe males and females within the same rm, such arguments cannot be
fully ruled out with the GSOEP analysis.
To address the problem of self-selection and unobserved rm-characteristics,
I additionally explore a 2006 linked rm-worker survey conducted by the
Great-Place-to-Work Institute and the German Federal Ministry of Labour
and Social A¤airs. The data set is representative for Germany and con-
tains detailed information on 305 German rms employing a minimum of 20
workers. For each rm a management representative provided company-level
information on organizational facts and HR instruments such as the struc-
ture of incentive systems. Most of this information is provided separately for
managers and workers in each rm.15 The management survey, for instance,
14In a recent AER paper Barseghyan et al. (2011) found that, in contrast to standard
theory, risk preferences are not stable across di¤erent decision contexts.
15More specically, answers were provided for employees in supervisory function and
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includes detailed information on the structure of incentive pay. For both
managerial and non-managerial employees the share of the average wage (in
%) determined by performance-related pay (henceforth PRP) is known.16
In addition to the management survey, the data set includes a represen-
tative employee-survey yielding over 36,000 observations spread across the
305 rms. Employees provide bio-demographic information on age, tenure,
gender, education and state if they work as a non-managerial, lower/middle
managerial or top managerial employee. The data set thus allows me to ob-
serve males and females at the same hierarchical position within the same
company. This within-rm variation should decrease problems that may arise
when male and female employees self-select into systematically di¤erent work
environments.
Most of the items contained in the employee survey aim to measure the
general level of trust, pride, cooperation and leadership quality for the com-
pany as a whole. However, the survey also includes items on individual
preferences. Employees rate their subjective importance of a high income,
good development opportunities and job security. Even though the job secu-
rity item may be more fuzzy than the validated risk measure in the GSOEP,
it may still highly correlate with risk attitudes as preferences for security can
be seen as the opposite of preferences for risk. The item is answered on a
5-point scale ranging from 1 "not important at all" to 5 "very important".
A histogram of all employee answers is depicted in gure 5.3.
The distribution of the risk proxy is heavily skewed to the left, with over
80% of observations stating that job security is "very important" and almost
everybody else stating that job security is "important" to them. To parallel
the previous analytic steps, I create a binary variable taking on the value 1 if
job security is very important and 0 otherwise. I then graph the distribution
of this dummy, separately for women and men, on each hierarchical level
while again including the estimatesrespective 95% condence intervals. The
result is presented in gure 5.4.
Again we observe that the proportion of "risk averse" women is larger on
the largest group of non-managerial employees, i.e. the core occupational group.
16See chapter 4 for a more detailed analysis of performance-related pay components.
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each hierarchical level. While the size of the di¤erences seem to be smaller in
absolute terms compared to the previous results, the 95% condence intervals
suggest that they are also signicant. Again the general level of risk aversion
decreases when climbing up the hierarchy, and again the gender-specic risk
di¤erences are, if at all, higher and not lower among managers.
Analogous to the previous chapter, I regress the risk aversion item on a
female dummy and a set of standard individual and rm controls, separately
for each given level. I also include a dummy which takes on the value 1 if
wages on that particular level contain a performance-related pay component
and zero otherwise. While agency theory predicts that risk averse agents
will avoid wage uncertainty caused by incentive pay and prefer xed wages
(e.g. Prendergast (1999) and the references therein), empirical evidence on
this topic is rather scarce.17 To account for the fact that individuals are
employed at the same rm, standard errors are clustered on the rm level.
The left panel of table 5.3 applies an ordered probit regression on the job
security item. The right panel reports marginal e¤ects from simple probit
models in which the latent variable is the propensity of perceiving job security
as very important.
17Recent eld evidence comes from Bellemare and Shearer (2010), Grund and Sliwka
(2010) who nd that risk averse workers are less likely to work under incentive pay.
Dohmen and Falk (2011) provide clean experimental evidence that risk averse individ-
uals are signicantly less likely to self-select into piece rates or tournaments schemes.
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Starting with the left panel, the results again match the graphical repre-
sentation of the raw data. On each job level, women are signicantly more
risk averse, with the female coe¢ cient being somewhat smaller for the lower
and middle management but substantially larger for the top management
level. Relating to the right panel, non-managerial female workers are roughly
5% more likely to consider job security as "very important" than their male
counterparts. This di¤erence remains almost identical for lower/middle man-
agers but more than doubles to 11% among top managers.
Second, employees who receive PRP are less risk averse (less likely to con-
sider job security as "very important"). This result seems to be particularly
true for managerial employees.18
In the last step of the analysis I interact the job level variable with the
female dummy to directly test for a decrease in the gender-specic risk di¤er-
ence on higher hierarchical levels. To rule out possible selection e¤ects and
the chance that unobserved rm or hierarchy inherent characteristics con-
found the relation between gender and risk preferences, I include rm-xed
e¤ects in my regressions.19
18There are several possible explanations for this nding: First, in absolute terms (lower
base wage) and in relative terms (lower % due to tari¤ systems) the PRP component for
managerials is much higher and therefore more salient than for non-managerials. Second,
bonus payments usually uctuate more among managerials than among non-managerials.
Third, managerialsPRP could in general by less a¤ected by own work e¤ort as bonus
payments are usually based on rm-level gures.
19I did not include xed-e¤ects in the separate regressions because I wanted to investi-
gate the link between the companys incentive system and risk aversion.
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The left panel of table 5.4 starts with the ordered probit regressions. Lin-
ear probability models explaining the risk dummy are added in the right panel
to facilitate the economic interpretation of the e¤ects.20 Column 1 conrms
an overall gender-specic risk di¤erence and that risk aversion signicantly
decreases on higher hierarchical levels. The linear probability models yields
that women are on average 4.5% more likely to assess job security as very
important. Top managers are roughly 11% less likely than non-managerial
workers to state that job security is very important to them. The second
column adds the interaction between gender and job position and reveals
that there are again no signicant di¤erences in the gender risk gap across
levels. Also, the 5% increase in the gender gap among top managers is not
signicant. Moreover, the female coe¢ cient, representing the gender risk gap
among non-managerials, is virtually identical to the estimate in the previous
table, suggesting that self-selection or rm unobservables do not drive the
results.
While the rm-xed e¤ects are able to capture the general wage level
in the rm, di¤erences in individual wages cannot be controlled for in the
GPTW data set. If we assume that female managers also earn less than male
managers in the data set and that higher incomes are related with more risk
seeking behavior, the estimated gender risk gap could be too large. Note,
however, that not controlling for the individual wage level in the GSOEP
analysis only slightly increases the gender coe¢ cients. In addition, even
though we do observe men and women in the same rm, it could still be the
case that, on a given rm level, managerial jobs for women systematically
di¤er from managerial jobs for men, e.g. they involve less risky decisions.
Future studies should therefore try to analyze rm data with even more
detailed information on hierarchical levels and job descriptions.
20Due to the interaction terms the estimation of marginal e¤ects from probit models
is not straighforward. However, the results for the non-interacted variables suggest that
the linear probability model yields very similar results compared to the probit regression
displayed in the previous table.
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5.4 Application: Performance-related Pay, Risk
and Female Managers
Currently, the underrepresentation of women in management positions and
high-paid jobs is intensely debated in politics and economics. Table 5.5 dis-
plays the share of females across di¤erent managerial positions in Germany.
While women make up roughly 50% of the workforce on the non-managerial
level, the share of females decreases along the hierarchy. In the top manage-
ment not even every 4th position is held by a women. While the two di¤erent
data sets provide rather similar results for the years 2006 and 2007, the
GSOEP data suggests that the share of female managers slightly increased
from 2007 to 2009.
Share of Females (in %)
Job Position GSOEP 2009 GSOEP 2007 GPTW 2006
Non-managerials 52.6% 52.4% 49.5%
Highly Skilled 31.3% 27.3% -
Lower Management 39.3% 36.0% -
Middle Management 28.6% 27.9% 26.2%
Top Management 24.0% 20.1% 20.0%
Table 5.5: Share of women across hierarchical positions in Germany
Other sources reveal that in 2009 only 2.4% of all board members in the
500 largest rms were female.21 While some countries (e.g. the Netherlands
or Norway) have already taken actions to raise this number by introducing
mandatory women quota, the source of female underrepresentation is still
not fully understood by economists. Gender di¤erences in risk preferences
are considered one piece of the puzzle: Since managerscompensation usually
depends to a much larger degree on bonuses and thus uctuates more (see
chapter 4), women may not want to apply for management positions because
they tend to dislike wage uncertainty more than men.
In table 5.6 I test this conjecture with the GPTW data. Taking each
rm as one observation, I use a simple OLS regression to explain the share
21Source: Hoppenstedt rm data base on June 2009.
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of female managers in the rm (0-100%) by the existence and strength of
managerial performance pay, holding constant other rm and industry char-
acteristics. Following the line of thought described above, one would expect
to see less female managers in rms that use performance-related pay for
managers.
Dependent Variable Share of female managers (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 if Manager PRP -4.310** -2.874
(1.937) (1.867)
1 if Manager PRP = 1-15% -3.513* -2.713
(2.027) (1.962)
1 if Manager PRP > 15% -6.151*** -3.856*
(2.364) (2.301)
Control: Managers Risk Preferences No No Yes Yes
Observations 293 287 291 285
R2 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.73
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses
Firm controls: rmsize dummies (3), industry dummies (11), share of female
non-managerials (in %), 1 if works council
Table 5.6: Share of female managers and performance-related pay
While the share of females among managers varies strongly across indus-
tries (from 7% in engineering to 66% in health and social work)22, the share
of female managers is indeed roughly 4 percentage points lower in compa-
nies in which managers receive performance-related pay. Given that in the
collapsed data set women on average only make up 26% of all managers, the
di¤erence amounts to roughly 16% in relative terms. Column 2 suggests that
the strength of incentives also matters. Compared to rms without manager-
ial incentives, the share of female managers is even 6 percentage points lower
when managerial PRP exceed 15% of the base wage.
A rst indication that gender-specic di¤erences in risk attitudes are at
least one driver of this result is given by column (3) and (4). Here, I re-
22Table 5.5 displays the distribution of female managerial and non-managerial employees
across all industries.
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estimate the specications in (1) and (2) but additionally control for the mean
magnitude of managerial risk aversion. The coe¢ cients for PRP decrease in
economic terms and are not statistically signicant at conventional levels.
From this I infer that the correlation between the existence of performance-
related pay and the share of females in the management is to some extent
driven by the omitted variable "risk attitudes". Once risk preferences are
controlled for, the existence of performance-related pay does no longer ex-
plain the percentage of female managers.
This parallels the experimental results by Dohmen and Falk (2011) who
nd that women are 23 percentage points less likely to self-select into variable
pay schemes. However, the authors stress that this gender di¤erence becomes
much smaller and insignicant once controls for risk preferences are in place.
The example illustrates that current managerial compensation practices
may also contribute to the relatively low share of female managers in Ger-
many. Considering gender-based di¤erentials in risk aversion when designing
incentive schemes may be one option to make leadership positions more at-
tractive for women.23
5.5 Conclusion
According to a recent literature overview by Croson and Gneezy (2009),
managers are considered an exception to the general rule that women are
more risk averse than men. The aim of the paper was to re-examine this
conclusion. For this I analyze two independent and representative surveys
of German employees. While the data of the German Socio-Economic Panel
allow me to base my analysis on a validated survey measure of risk which has
shown to be a reliable predictor of actual risk taking in real-stakes lotteries,
the second data set includes observations of women and men within the same
rm.
In both data sets the gender gap in risk attitudes remains roughly the
same across levels, i.e. women are on all hierarchical levels more risk averse
23Currently, it seems that executive compensation is structured very similarly for men
and women (see for instance Vieito and Khan (2010)).
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than men. The pattern of risk aversion across levels and gender appears to
be quite consistent across the two data sets. Moreover, as the analysis of the
second data set shows, the results do not seem to be confounded by female
managers systematically self-selecting into di¤erent rms than their male
counterparts. While risk aversion generally decreases on higher hierarchical
levels, the decrease is not larger for women and therefore does not o¤set the
risk gap observed among non-managerials. This observation is in contrast to
the conclusion drawn by Croson and Gneezy (2009) and the argument that
after selection into management positions women and men do not di¤er with
respect to risk attitudes.24
Apart from gender, the existence of performance-related pay is also sig-
nicantly tied to the likelihood of observing a risk averse employee in the
rm, a¢ rming recent eld evidence by Bellemare and Shearer (2010) and
Grund and Sliwka (2010).
24The result is, however, in line with a working paper by Niessen and Ruenzi (2007)
showing that female fund managers are more risk averse and pursue less extreme invest-
ment strategies than their male colleagues.
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